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The Unfulfilled Promise of
Environmental Constitutionalism
AMBER POLK†
The political push for the adoption of state-level “green amendments” in the United States has
gained significant traction in just the last couple of years. Green amendments add an
environmental right to a state’s constitution. Five such amendments were made in the 1970s in
Pennsylvania, Montana, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Illinois. This Article looks in depth at the
case law that has developed the contours of these constitutional environmental rights in the wake
of the political revival of environmental constitutionalism in the United States. I distill two
lessons from this jurisprudence. First, constitutional environmental rights are interpreted by the
courts as procedural rights, not substantive rights. Second, in interpreting constitutional
environmental rights, courts look to other legal doctrines to define the content and scope of the
constitutional environmental right, generally on the basis of the constitutional language. I argue
that because these rights are interpreted as procedural rights, they fail to effectuate the
paradigm shift that we should expect from a rights-based environmentalism, and so the promise
of environmental constitutionalism remains unfulfilled.
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INTRODUCTION
“Each person shall have a right to clean air and water, and a healthful
environment.”1 On November 2, 2021, New York voters ratified this
constitutional amendment, adding it to the New York Bill of Rights. As the first
state to add an environmental right to its constitution in more than forty years,2
New York has received significant praise for this environmental achievement.3
The ratification of a new “green amendment” reflects a revival of political
interest in environmental constitutionalism in the United States, an idea first
debated during the modern environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s,4
and recently resurrected in a recent landmark decision by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.5
This political revival of environmental constitutionalism raises several
crucial questions. Who holds and can enforce such rights? What do they require
or forbid, and against whom? Does it matter that they are constitutional (as
opposed to, for example, statutory) rights? What environmental outcomes can
they secure? Do answers to any of these questions affect where our
environmental movement should focus its energy? While there has been some
work done on the international stage to begin answering these questions, not
nearly as much has been done in the United States.
The task of this Article, therefore, is to begin answering these questions for
the United States. In doing so, I argue that the current state of environmental
constitutionalism in the United States is far weaker for achieving environmental
goals than the political discourse around the movement would suggest. To
defend this claim, I begin in Part I with a brief history of environmental
1. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 19.
2. Prior to 2021, the most recent ratification of a state constitutional environmental right was by Hawaii
in 1978. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
3. See, e.g., Environmental Rights Amendment Passes in New York, EARTHJUSTICE (Nov. 3, 2021),
https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2021/environmental-rights-amendment-passes-in-new-york.
4. See generally, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193
(1972) (reviewing the state constitutional environmental rights trend of the early 1970s and supporting the
expansion of state constitutional environmental rights); Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Due Process and Pollution:
The Right to a Remedy, 16 VILL. L. REV. 789 (1971) (arguing that we should not look to either statutory or
common law for addressing environmental problems, but instead to state constitutions and the Federal
Constitution, namely the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); John S. Winder, Jr.,
Environmental Rights for the Environmental Polity, 5 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 820 (1971) (advocating for the
recognition of an environmental right grounded in the Ninth Amendment as well as elsewhere in the law).
5. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013); see also MAYA K. VAN ROSSUM, THE
GREEN AMENDMENT: SECURING OUR RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 249 (2017). Van Rossum has served
as the Delaware Riverkeeper since 1996 and as the leader for the Delaware Riverkeeper Network since 1994.
She was one of the named plaintiffs in Robinson Township and advocates for other state constitutional
environmental rights in the United States on the basis of the Robinson Township victory. See id. at 221–48; see
also Barry E. Hill, Time for a New Age of Enlightenment for U.S. Environmental Law and Policy: Where Do We
Go from Here? 49 ENV’T L. REP. 10362, 10362 (2019) (advocating for environmental constitutionalism through
constitutional environmental rights amendments in the United States).
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constitutionalism to contextualize where the United States sits relative to the
international environmental constitutionalism movement. In Part II, I examine
in detail the jurisprudence that has developed the legal contours of five state
constitutional environmental rights in the United States. It is this case law that
sheds light on the details of what a constitutional environmental right is and can
be. In Part III, I identify two broad lessons that can be learned from this case
law. First, constitutional environmental rights are largely procedural rights that
do not secure entitlement to substantive environmental outcomes. Second, courts
look to other legal doctrines to fill out the contours of these constitutional
environmental rights. In Part IV, I discuss how the development of
environmental constitutionalism has failed to effectuate the paradigm shift we
would expect from the constitutionalization of substantive environmental rights.
This failure is why the promise of environmental constitutionalism remains
largely unfulfilled. Finally, in Part V, I provide pragmatic advice, derived from
what we learn in Parts II and III, to state legislators looking to constitutionalize
an environmental right.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
Environmental constitutionalism makes its aim the constitutionalization of
environmental rights.6 The push to constitutionalize environmental rights in the
United States is not a recent phenomenon. It was part of the response to the
environmental “awakening”7 of the 1960s. In 1962, Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring alerted the public to the significant harms that indiscriminate chemical
use by the chemical industry had on all living things in nature.8 In 1967, the
world witnessed the Torrey Canyon spill off the coast of England.9 In 1969, the
Cuyahoga River caught fire.10 By the late 1960s, dead fish lined the shores of
Lake Erie, prompting proclamations of the lake’s “death” because its waters had
become so polluted.11 In response, at the end of the 1960s, there were calls for
legal reform to address environmental pollution. Included in that response were

6. See Hill, supra note 5; VAN ROSSUM, supra note 5, at 221–48; TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 9 (2005) (grounding constitutional environmental rights in the notion of a human right
to an adequate environment). See generally ERIN DALY & JAMES R. MAY, IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CURRENT GLOBAL CHALLENGES (Erin Daly & James R. eds., 2018); JAMES R. MAY &
ERIN DALY, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2014); DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2011).
7. BOYD, supra note 6, at 10.
8. Id.
9. Bethan Bell & Mario Cacciottolo, Torrey Canyon Oil Spill: The Day the Sea Turned Black, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-39223308.
10. Michael Rotman, Cuyahoga River Fire, CLEVELAND HIST., https://clevelandhistorical.org/items/show
/63 (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
11. Alan Edmonds, Death of a Great Lake, MACLEAN’S, Nov. 1, 1965, at 28.
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several attempts to add an environmental rights amendment to the Federal
Constitution.12 While those attempts failed, the discussions they facilitated lead
to the adoption of constitutional environmental rights in the constitutions of five
states: Pennsylvania (1971),13 Montana (1972),14 Hawaii (1978),15
Massachusetts (1972),16 and Illinois (1970)17 (“original states”). Two
contemporary scholars have even labeled this period as the time when “the
United States was at the vanguard of environmental constitutionalism.”18 As
history would have it, the United States did not remain in that vanguard for very
long.
The environmental awakening of the 1960s simultaneously called for an
international response to the problem of environmental pollution and
degradation.19 That response took the form of the world’s first eco-summit held
in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972. The result of that summit, the Stockholm
Declaration, produced the “most innocuous”20 of resolutions which ultimately
ignited the international environmental constitutionalism movement:21
12. See Richard O. Brooks, A Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment, 16 VT. L. REV. 1063, 1068
(1992) (recounting several efforts in the late 1960s to add an environmental rights amendment to the Federal
Constitution). Perhaps the most notable attempt to add an environmental rights amendment to the Constitution
was proposed by Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin before the first Earth Day in 1970. H.R.J. Res. 1321,
90th Cong. (1968) (“Every person has the inalienable right to a decent environment. The United States and every
state shall guarantee this right.”).
13. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
14. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; id. art. IX, § 1.
15. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
16. MASS. CONST. art. XLIX, amended by MASS. CONST. art. XCVII.
17. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2. Some commentators include Rhode Island in this list. See, e.g., Barry E. Hill,
Environmental Rights, Public Trust, and Public Nuisance: Addressing Climate Injustices Through State Climate
Liability Litigation, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 11022, 11029–30 (2020); Art English & John J. Carroll, State
Constitutions and Environmental Bills of Rights, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3–18 (2015),
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/English%20Carroll%20 2015.pdf. I exclude Rhode Island
because Rhode Island’s constitutional language and case law make it clear that the essence of the environmental
right contained in Article I, Section 17 is an individual “privilege right,” not a “claim right,” which is what we
see in the five original states. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 68 (1913) (distinguishing between claim and privilege rights). The
nature of Rhode Island’s privilege right is that individuals assert entitlements to use Rhode Island’s fisheries and
shores as they please, challenging government restrictions on that manner of use. See, e.g., Riley v. R.I. Dep’t
Env’t Mgmt., 941 A.2d 198, 208 (R.I. 2008) (upholding state catch restrictions on certain species targeted by
the fishing industry as not violating the “rights of fishery”); Town of Middletown v. Wehrley, No. N3 98-281A,
2000 WL 343902, at *2–3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2000) (upholding the banning of horseback riding on the
beach during the summer months as not violating the “privileges of the shore”). The original five constitutional
environmental rights are in essence claim rights, where courts are faced with determining the content, scope, and
force of an alleged duty borne by the government or private party. See generally infra Part III.
18. MAY & DALY, supra note 6, at 65.
19. BOYD, supra note 6, at 12.
20. Oliver A. Houck, A Case of Sustainable Development: The River God and the Forest at the End of the
World, 44 TULSA L. REV. 275, 305 (2008).
21. See MAY & DALY, supra note 6, at 66 (calling the Stockholm Conference “the sentinel spark of
environmental constitutionalism”).
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Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions
of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and wellbeing, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the
environment for present and future generations. In this respect, policies
promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination,
colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination stand
condemned and must be eliminated.22

At the time of the Stockholm Declaration, there were no national
constitutional environmental rights.23 Portugal (1976) and Spain (1978) were the
first to recognize the right to live in a healthy environment in their
constitutions.24 And by 2011, ninety-two nations had recognized a substantive
environmental right in their constitutions.25 What started as somewhat
“idiosyncratic” is now “routine” in constitutions around the world.26
During this four-decade-long global trend toward environmental
constitutionalism, the five U.S. constitutional environmental rights remained
relatively dormant in American environmental law.27 That has changed
significantly in the last ten years, not only because of developments in
Pennsylvania, but also because of developments in Montana and Hawaii.
Environmental constitutionalism in the United States has emerged from a long
hiatus. The jurisprudential developments of these state constitutional
environmental rights have produced sharper contours of the ever-elusive content
and meaning of a constitutional environmental right.28 They have also grounded
22. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan for the Human
Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972).
23. See BOYD, supra note 6, at 47.
24. Id. at 62.
25. Id. at 59, 63.
26. See MAY & DALY, supra note 6, at 66. Furthermore, in October 2021, the United Nations Human
Rights Council passed a first-of-its-kind resolution recognizing a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment as
a human right. Human Rights Council Res. 48/13 (Oct. 8, 2021). Such a resolution is another step toward
affirming the human rights basis for constitutional environmental rights around the world. See HAYWARD, supra
note 6, at 36 (arguing that constitutional environmental rights are grounded on human rights to an adequate
environment).
27. The United States has not been alone in its resistance to environmental constitutionalism. Such
resistance appears to be the norm among common-law nations. See BOYD, supra note 6, at 60 (noting that his
compiled statistics “indicate that there is ongoing resistance among common-law nations to the constitutional
recognition of the right to a healthy environment”). However, the United States goes one step further:
The United States appears to be the only nation that expressly denies the existence of the right to a
healthy environment in both domestic and international law. The US argues that if the right is in fact
part of customary international law, it does not apply to Americans because the US government has
persistently objected to its recognition.
Id. at 91.
28. See MAY & DALY, supra note 6, at 30 (noting “the difficulty of defining the scope of the environmental
right”); see also Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 406 (2012) (“By adjudicating cases, courts
make constitutional rights.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 235 (1995) (“Everyone professionally
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a political movement working toward expanding “green amendments” to other
state constitutions, including New York,29 New Jersey,30 Iowa,31 Kentucky,32
Maine,33 New Mexico,34 Oregon,35 Vermont,36 Washington,37 and West
Virginia.38
In light of these recent developments in environmental constitutionalism in
the United States, we sit at an important juncture for reviewing the movement’s
legal successes and limits. There is significant jurisprudence developing each
right in each of the five original states. This creates an opportunity to conduct a
rich comparison of the contours of the environmental rights across those states,
beyond the bare constitutional language or isolated opinions.39 To sketch the
contours of these rights, I will examine the cases that have interpreted them. It
is to this task I turn next.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE STATES
Each of the five original states has its own constitutional text and case law
developing its constitutional environmental right. Because the original states
have developed their constitutional environmental rights independently of one
another, this Part discusses each state in a separate Subpart. For ease of
reference, within each state, I address the constitutional text separately from the
case law. It is important to recognize that none of the original states have the
same constitutional text. This is particularly relevant for states looking to
propose a green amendment, as the constitutional text plays an important role in
determining the contours of the constitutional environmental right. Finally, I

involved with law knows that, as Holmes put it, judges legislate ‘interstitially,’ which is to say they make law,
only more cautiously, more slowly, and in more principled, less partisan, fashion than legislators.”).
29. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 19.
30. Assemb. Con. Res. 80, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020).
31. H.R.J. Res. 12, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2021).
32. H.B. 107, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021).
33. S. 196, 130th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2021).
34. H.R.J. Res. 2, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2022).
35. S.J. Res. 5, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ore. 2021).
36. S. 9, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2020).
37. H.R.J. Res. 4205, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
38. H.R.J. Res. 25, 84th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (W.V. 2019). For completeness, I note that a constitutional
environmental rights amendment was also proposed in Maryland, see H.B. 517, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md.
2020), but was withdrawn by its sponsors less than two months later. Legislation HB0517, MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/HB0517?ys=2020RS (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
39. See Leong, supra note 28 (“[R]ights made in a single context are distorted by the idiosyncrasies of that
context. Any context emphasizes certain interests and circumstances at the expense of others, and when rights
are made only in a single context, those interests and circumstances deform the right over time. By contrast,
rights made in multiple contexts are richer, more balanced, and more comprehensive.”). See generally David R.
Boyd, The Implicit Constitutional Right To Live in a Healthy Environment, 20 REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENV’T
L. 171 (2011) (providing an overview of various countries that have recognized an implicit right to a healthy
environment without an in-depth review of the jurisprudence developing the scope and content of the right).
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discuss each state’s case law chronologically to demonstrate how the
constitutional environmental right developed over time.
A. PENNSYLVANIA
1.

The Constitutional Text

Pennsylvania’s constitutional environmental right is located in Article I,
Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It states:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the
people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people.40

Article I contains Pennsylvania’s declaration of “inherent and indefeasible”
rights,41 which means that the environmental right contained in Section 27 is a
fundamental right in Pennsylvania.42 The right is also “inherent in man’s nature
and preserved rather than created by the Pennsylvania Constitution.”43
2.

The Case Law

The first case to test the Section 27 right in Pennsylvania was also the case
that established the right’s legal impotence from its ratification in 1971 until the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court revamped the right in 2013. The first Payne v.
Kassab (Payne I) case involved a dispute over a street-widening project on River
Street in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania, that would encroach upon a historical
common area, known as the River Common.44 Relying on their Section 27
rights, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin this street-widening project because of the
alleged “negative impact it w[ould] have on the historical, scenic, recreational
and environmental values of . . . the River Common.”45 In opposition to the
government’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs urged the Commonwealth Court
“to read Article I, Section 27 in absolute terms.”46 However, the court observed
that “it becomes difficult to imagine any activity in the vicinity of River Street
that would not offend the interpretation of Article I, Section 27 which plaintiffs

40. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
41. Id. § 1.
42. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 947 (Pa. 2013).
43. Id. at 948.
44. See Payne v. Kassab (Payne I), 312 A.2d 86, 89–92 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d on other grounds,
361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
45. Payne v. Kassab (Payne II), 361 A.2d 263, 264 (Pa. 1976).
46. Payne I, 312 A.2d at 94.
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urge[d] upon [it].”47 Unwilling to interpret the constitutional environmental right
in absolute terms, the court defaulted to a position of “controlled development”
rather than “no development,” and announced a three-part balancing test for
evaluating Section 27 claims.48
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address the
Commonwealth Court’s balancing test, nor did it address the question of whether
the right is self-executing, on the ground that it had no reason “to explore th[at]
difficult terrain.”49 However, the court did observe a couple of important points.
First, Section 27 “speaks in no such absolute terms” as urged by the plaintiffs in
the lower court decision. Second, while the commonwealth has duties to
conserve and maintain public natural resources for the benefit of all, the
commonwealth “is also required to perform other duties, such as the
maintenance of an adequate public highway system, also for the benefit of all
the people.”50 The court therefore concluded that “[i]t is manifest that a
balancing must take place.”51 The nature of such balancing, in the case of the
River Common, was to avoid using it altogether for highway purposes unless
there was no feasible alternative, thereby minimizing the environmental or
ecological harm from such use.52
A lesson from Payne I and II is that a constitutional environmental right
poses a challenge to courts in terms of determining the right’s force among other
duties borne by the government, particularly when the complainant demands a
particular substantive environmental outcome. The Payne courts refused to treat
the right as absolute, which would necessitate a categorical ban of the highwaywidening project. Yet the only alternative they saw to recognizing an absolute
right was to implement a balancing test, where the environmental duty was no
more important than numerous other, less fundamental governmental duties. The
practical result of Payne I and II is that Section 27 cases were evaluated under
the three-part balancing test articulated by the Commonwealth Court for the next

47. Id.
48. That balancing test considered (1) whether there was compliance with all applicable statutes and
regulations relevant to the protection of the commonwealth’s public natural resources, (2) whether the record
demonstrated a reasonable effort to reduce the environmental incursion to a minimum, and (3) whether the
environmental harm that would result from the challenged decision or action so clearly outweighed the benefits
to be derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of discretion. Id.
49. See Payne II, 361 A.2d at 272–73. The doctrine of self-execution has to do with the question of whether
the constitutional language provides a complete and enforceable rule that a court could implement without the
aid of legislative enactment. See Jose L. Fernandez, State Constitutions, Environmental Rights Provisions, and
the Doctrine of Self-Execution, 17 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 333, 333 (1993). Because Pennsylvania and Hawaii
have recently found the right to be self-executing, I do not focus on that issue in this Article.
50. Payne II, 361 A.2d at 273 (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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forty years,53 and the right was never really vindicated as a right, let alone a
fundamental right until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth.
In Robinson Township, seven municipalities, an environmental
organization, and a physician brought suit for a declaration that major provisions
of a recently enacted state oil and gas statute, Act 13,54 were unconstitutional.
While the plaintiffs challenged numerous Act 13 provisions in Robinson
Township, I focus on those provisions struck down pursuant to Section 27.55 Act
13 preempted local governments from passing ordinances or making zoning
decisions regarding any oil and gas activity in their jurisdictions.56 Oil and gas
drilling operations were made matters of statewide concern and uniformity,
subject to the direction and control of the legislature. In terms of protecting
waterways from fracking wells, Act 13 provided only “modest oil and gas well
restrictions in reference to sensitive water resources.” But even that imposed no
real duty on the oil and gas industry, as they were “entitled to automatic waivers
of setbacks” upon submission of a “sufficient plan” to the Department of
Environmental Protection.57
Only after the Robinson Township plurality determined that (1) the case
was justiciable, (2) the plaintiffs had standing,58 (3) the controversy was ripe for
53. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 966 (Pa. 2013) (“In subsequent cases implicating
Section 27 challenges, the Commonwealth Court has generally applied its Payne test to a wide array of factual
circumstances. . . . More importantly, the Payne test appears to have become, for the Commonwealth Court, the
benchmark for Section 27 decisions in lieu of the constitutional text.”).
54. The history of Act 13 is pretty sordid. Act 13 came about in response to local opposition to horizontal
hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) on the Marcellus Shale, which sits primarily in central New York,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. See VAN ROSSUM, supra note 5, at 6–8. In New York, communities “invoked
their municipal authority to ban fracking town by town.” Id. at 6. In Pennsylvania, such local bans were not
clearly established as legal under state law, but most localities were electing to invoke their zoning powers to
limit the location of fracking wells. Id. at 6–7. According to van Rossum, “[i]n response, the industry got busy
in the halls of the state capitol in Harrisburg. Pitching drilling and fracking as a job-creating engine for the state,
they covered up the environmental, public safety, and community devastation that was already resulting.” Id. at
7. Perceiving receptiveness from the Pennsylvania legislature, the oil and gas industries themselves wrote Act
13 and delivered it to state legislators, many of whom did not even read it. Id. at 8. Despite significant grassroot
efforts to block the bill, in February 2012, it was passed by the legislature, and shortly thereafter, it was signed
into law by Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett. Id.
55. While I limit my discussion to matters decided in 2013, after remand, the case went back up to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2016 to address the severability of statutory provisions, a medical gag rule, and
the provision in Act 13 conferring the power of eminent domain on private oil and gas entities, none of which
were challenged under Article I, Section 27. See generally Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536
(Pa. 2016).
56. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 970 (“The General Assembly’s stated intent in Act 13 is to preempt and
supersede ‘local regulation of oil and gas operations regulated by the [statewide] environmental acts, as provided
in [Chapter 33].’”).
57. Id. at 973.
58. Standing is one of two major legal doctrines (the other being self-execution) that have been focal points
of debate in the push to expand legal rights to address environmental problems. Because standing has been
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review, and (4) judicial review of the Act did not violate the separation of powers
doctrine or constitute a political question—none of which are trivial issues59—
did the court begin its (re)development of a substantive jurisprudence of the
Section 27 environmental right. As an initial matter, Section 27 contains two
separate rights of the people. The first “right,” contained in the first clause, is a
traditional fundamental right of the people that limits governmental power. The
second “right,” contained in clauses two and three, is related to the notion of a
“public trust,” though it was not developed by the court along the lines of the
so-called “public trust doctrine.”60 These two rights are distinct legal doctrines
with the public trust clauses dominating the Section 27 jurisprudence.
With respect to the first clause of Section 27, which declares a substantive
right of Pennsylvanians to clean air and pure water, and the preservation of
natural, scenic, historic, and aesthetic values of the environment, the Robinson
Township plurality determined that the right imposes an obligation on all levels
of state government to refrain from “unduly infringing upon or violating the
‘right.’”61 The government cannot “unreasonably impair the right,” and the
benchmark for deciding whether government action unreasonably impairs the
right to “clean water” and “pure air” is to treat the right as a “bulwark against
actual or likely degradation of, inter alia, [state] air water and quality.”62 Despite
this language indicating the high importance of the right, the plurality limited its
force by concluding that the right does not call for a “stagnant landscape,” “the
derailment of economic or social development,” or “for the sacrifice of other
fundamental values.”63 The right is “on par with” other fundamental rights in
Article I, and the plurality recognized that this “parity may serve to limit” the
invocation of the environmental right against the government in cases where it
conflicts with property rights, for example.64 Finally, conceding that the
“development promoting the economic well-being of the citizenry obviously is
a legitimate state interest,” the plurality concluded that the right simply prevents
“unreasonable degradation of the environment” in pursuit of those ends and
promotes “sustainable property use and economic development.”65
The second and third clauses of Section 27 constitute Pennsylvania’s
“public trust doctrine,” although the Robinson Township plurality interpreted the
clauses through the lens of private trust principles. The second and third clauses
established in Pennsylvania, Montana, and Hawaii in several cases, I do not focus on the issue (which varies
among the states).
59. 83 A.3d at 916–30.
60. For a discussion of the common-law public trust doctrine, see generally Joseph Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
61. 83 A.3d at 951–52.
62. Id. at 951, 953.
63. Id. at 953.
64. Id. at 953–54.
65. Id. at 954.
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create a public trust, where (1) the people of Pennsylvania are the trust’s settlors;
(2) the commonwealth, at all levels of government, is the trustee; and (3) the
people of Pennsylvania, including future generations, are the trust’s
beneficiaries.66 The people, including future generations, have rights correlative
to the commonwealth’s duties as trustee with respect to the trust corpus. The
trust corpus is a “narrower category of ‘public’ natural resources than [those
contained in] the first clause,” and it includes “not only state-owned lands,
waterways, and mineral reserves, but also resources that implicate the public
interest, such as ambient air, surface and ground water, wild flora, and fauna
(including fish) that are outside the scope of purely private property.”67
In accordance with principles of private trust law at the time Section 27
was ratified,68 the commonwealth as trustee has duties to comply with the terms
of the trust; in other words, “to conserve and maintain” the public natural
resources of Pennsylvania, as well as the fiduciary duties that are imparted on
all trustees, such as the duties of prudence, loyalty, and impartiality.69 Whereas
the commonwealth’s duties under clause one are entirely negative, the
commonwealth’s trustee duties under clauses two and three are both negative
and positive.70 As to the commonwealth’s negative duty as trustee, the
commonwealth must “refrain from performing its trustee duties respecting the
environment unreasonably, including via legislative enactments or executive
action.”71 As to the commonwealth’s positive duty as trustee, it must “act
affirmatively to protect the environment, via legislative action.”72 These trustee
duties of the commonwealth “do not require a freeze of the existing public
natural resource stock.”73 They “are tempered by legitimate development
tending to improve upon the lot of Pennsylvania’s citizenry, with the evident
goal of promoting sustainable development.”74 In determining the scope of the
trustee’s duties to the present generation as opposed to future generations, the
plurality relied on the trustee’s duty of impartiality, which does not demand
equal treatment, but only equitable treatment in light of the beneficiaries’
interests. Section 27 “offers protection equally against actions with immediate
severe impact on public natural resources and against actions with minimal or

66. Id. at 954–56.
67. Id. at 955.
68. Id. at 956.
69. Id. at 957.
70. Id. at 957–58.
71. Id. at 957. This is technically both a negative and affirmative duty, as the commonwealth is itself
obligated to not unreasonably degrade the trust corpus or prevent private parties from unreasonably degrading
the trust corpus.
72. Id. at 958.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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insignificant present consequences that are actually or likely to have significant
or irreversible effects in the short or long term.”75
In applying these newly articulated contours of the constitutional
environmental right, the plurality interpreted the constitutional challenge to Act
13 to “implicate primarily the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee” under clauses
two and three.76 The concerns with the challenged provisions of Act 13 can be
distilled into two categories: (1) the degradation of the trust corpus, and (2) the
disparate impacts between trust beneficiaries. First, the preemption of a local
government’s ability to enact land-use measures and eliminate current land-use
restrictions “fundamentally disrupted” citizens’ expectations concerning the
environment in which they were living, including habitability and ownership
interests and expectations. Such actions failed to respect the fact that protection
of environmental values is “a quintessential local issue that must be tailored to
local conditions.”77 Because Act 13’s preemption of local land governance
permitted “industrial oil and gas operations as a use ‘of right’ in every zoning
district throughout the Commonwealth, including in residential, commercial,
and agricultural districts,”78 it “alter[ed] existing expectations of communities
and property owners and substantially diminishe[d] natural and aesthetic values
of the local environment, which contribute significantly to a quality of
environmental life in Pennsylvania.”79 Accordingly, it degraded the corpus of
the trust. Second, this preemption of local land governance that permitted
industrial uses in all zoning districts ignored the fact that “some properties and
communities will carry much heavier environmental and habitability burdens
than others.”80 Act 13’s “blunt approach fail[ed] to account for th[e]
constitutional command” to “treat all beneficiaries equitably in light of the
purposes of the trust,”81 causing disparate impacts among the trust beneficiaries
contrary to the trustee’s duty of impartiality. Accordingly, the preemption
provisions of Act 13 failed to pass constitutional muster, even though the court
acknowledged that the Commonwealth made a “compelling policy argument[]”
that Act 13 provided economic and energy benefits pursuant to its duty to
provide for the general welfare.82
As to the oil and gas industry’s entitlement to automatic waivers of
setbacks under Act 13, the court concluded that that provision was
unconstitutional on the same two grounds as the preemption provisions. Because
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 959.
Id. at 974.
Id. at 977, 979.
Id. at 979.
Id.
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id. at 981.
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the waiver-of-setbacks scheme lacked “identifiable and readily-enforceable
environmental standards for granting well permits or setback waivers,” it failed
to “conserve and maintain” the waters of the commonwealth.83 Additionally, it
was “non-responsive to local concerns,” which would cause “a disparate impact
upon beneficiaries of the trust,” and was therefore “irreconcilable with the
trustee’s duty of impartiality.”84
As a plurality opinion, Robinson Township had a brief period of uncertainty
as to its precedential value until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took up its
next Section 27 case in 2017 in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense
Foundation v. Commonwealth (PEDF II).85 PEDF II is another citizen suit that
challenged several state statutes reallocating revenue derived from leasing state
forest and park lands for oil and gas extraction.86 The revenue at issue included
gas-well rents, royalties, and bonus payments, paid from the oil and gas
companies to the Commonwealth to search for and extract natural gas from state
lands.87 The constitutional challenge regarding the allocation of this revenue is
well-summarized by Professor John Dernbach:
Three legislative amendments to the state fiscal code between 2008 and 2014
redirected a total of $335 million that would have been used for conservation
purposes under the [Lease Fund Act] to the general fund, where it is
appropriated for a variety of state government purposes. In addition, the
Legislature prevented [the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and
Natural Resources,] DCNR[,] from spending any [Lease Fund Act] royalties
without prior legislative authorization. Finally, the Legislature began using
[Lease Fund] revenue to support the overall budget of DCNR, rather than
obtaining that budget money from the general fund and using [Lease Fund]
money for conservation purposes related to oil and gas extraction.88

In deciding this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved several
questions left open by the Robinson Township opinion. First, the PEDF II
majority explicitly rejected the three-part Payne balancing test that had been
used by lower courts to evaluate Section 27 challenges for forty years and had
been left in legal limbo by the Robinson Township plurality.89 Second, the PEDF
II court adopted the Section 27 jurisprudential principles articulated in Robinson
Township.90 This eliminated the possibility that the careful environmental rights
jurisprudence developed by the Robinson Township plurality would be eroded
83. Id. at 983–84.
84. Id. at 984.
85. 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017).
86. Id. at 916.
87. Id. at 920.
88. Id. at 925 (quoting John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust,
45 ENV’T. L. 463, 488 (2015)).
89. Id. at 930.
90. Id.
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in future cases as non-binding. Third, the PEDF II court confirmed that the
public trust provisions of Section 27 right were self-executing and did not
require implementing legislation.91
In resolving the dispute, the determinative legal principle was that under
Pennsylvania trust law, proceeds from the sale of trust assets are part of the trust
principal, remain part of the corpus of the trust, and can only be used in
accordance with the trust’s purpose.92 In the case of the oil and gas revenues at
issue in PEDF II, the only question then was whether the royalties, rents, and
bonus payments from the oil and gas leases constituted “sales of trust assets,”
and whether the diversion of those revenues by the challenged legislation put
trust assets toward ends inconsistent with the trust’s purpose, including purposes
that were not “conserving and maintaining” the public natural resources.93 The
PEDF II court found that the royalty payments constituted a sale of the
environmental trust’s assets and that those royalties were being “spent in a
multitude of ways entirely unrelated to the conservation and maintenance of our
public natural resources” under the challenged legislation.94 Therefore, the court
held that the legislation was facially unconstitutional.95 The classification of
rents and bonus payments under 1971 Pennsylvania trust law was remanded to
the Commonwealth Court for initial determination.96
These three cases, Payne, Robinson Township, and PEDF II, constitute the
overarching framework of Pennsylvania’s constitutional environmental
jurisprudence at this time. The Commonwealth Court continues to fill in the
details of this framework as Section 27 cases are brought before it.97 For
example, in addressing challenges to regulations under the remaining provisions
of Act 13, the Commonwealth Court determined that playground owners are not
Section 27 trustees, and that no state agency can elevate playground owners to
that status.98 The Commonwealth Court has also held, in an unreported opinion,
that mandamus is an available remedy under Section 27 when challenging

91. Id. at 937.
92. Id. at 935.
93. See id. at 939 (emphasis omitted) (“[T]he legislature violates Section 27 when it diverts proceeds from
oil and gas development to a non-trust purpose without exercising its fiduciary duties as trustee.”).
94. Id. at 937.
95. Id. at 938.
96. Id. at 939. On remand, the Commonwealth Court held that the rental and bonus payments did not
constitute income generated from trust assets. See Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 214 A.3d 748, 773
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019). This holding was reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pennsylvania
Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 255 A.3d 289, 293 (Pa. 2021).
97. See generally John C. Dernbach, Thinking Anew About the Environmental Rights Amendment: An
Analysis of Recent Commonwealth Court Decisions, 30 WIDENER COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 147 (2020)
(discussing recent Commonwealth Court cases involving Article I, Section 27).
98. Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 193 A.3d 447, 485 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018).
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agency inaction regarding contamination clean up.99 Perhaps most important,
however, is the fact that “[i]n the cases decided thus far, the Commonwealth
Court has rejected all Section 27 challenges to local government decisions
permitting shale gas development.”100 This means that Robinson Township only
commanded that the state government could not wholly usurp local
governments’ decision-making authority with respect to oil and gas drilling in
Pennsylvania. Indeed, the Commonwealth Court upheld, under Section 27, one
locality’s decision to allow “oil and gas well operations in all zoning districts so
long as it satisfie[d] enumerated standards designed to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare.”101 This development calls into question the role of
constitutional environmental rights in setting substantive environmental
standards as opposed to merely playing a role in citizen participation in selfgovernance. This is a reoccurring theme in several other states’ jurisprudence
that I will revisit in Part III. For now, I transition to Montana’s constitutional
environmental right and its attendant jurisprudence.
B. MONTANA
1.

The Constitutional Text

Montana’s constitutional environmental right is located in two different
constitutional provisions. Article II, Section 3 states: “All persons are born free
and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and
healthful environment. . . . In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize
corresponding responsibilities.”102 Article IX, Section 1 states:
(1) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful
environment in Montana for present and future generations.
(2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this
duty.
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the
environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate
remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural
resources.103

99. Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Pa. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., No. 525 M.D. 2017, 2018 WL 3554639, at *2–
3, *5–6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 4, 2018). The Commonwealth Court recently denied the plaintiff’s motion for
partial summary judgment in this case. Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Pa. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., No. 525 M.D.
2017, 2021 WL 3354898, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 3, 2021). This case will be the first to decide the scope
of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection’s positive substantive environmental duty to clean
up a pollution site, including the speed with which such cleanup is required. See infra Part IV.A.
100. Dernbach, supra note 97, at 169.
101. Frederick v. Allegheny Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 196 A.3d 677, 679 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018).
102. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
103. Id. art. IX, § 1.
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The Article II, Section 3 environmental right is an inalienable and
fundamental right.104 Article IX of the Montana Constitution contains seven
sections, all of which are devoted to addressing the management of Montana’s
natural resources. Contrary to Article II, Article IX does not speak of
fundamental or inalienable rights. This is a discrepancy that the Montana
Supreme Court had to address in developing its constitutional environmental
rights jurisprudence.
2.

The Case Law

Montana’s constitutional environmental right received a brief glance from
the Montana Supreme Court in 1979105 but otherwise remained in relative
obscurity until the court revived it in 1999. In Montana Environmental
Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality (MEIC), three
environmental coalitions filed suit over an exploration license for gold mining
that the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) granted to a
private mining company.106 The plaintiffs alleged that DEQ had illegally
amended the exploration license “to allow for the discharge of groundwater
containing high levels of arsenic and zinc into the shallow aquifers of the
Blackfoot and Landers Fork rivers,” without performing the statutorily required
non-degradation review.107 The plaintiffs further argued that to the extent such
a review was exempted under another section of the statute (“exemption
statute”), such a statutory provision violated their constitutional environmental
rights provided in Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1.108
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court had to decide (1) whether the
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the exemption statute, and, if so, (2) whether
the exemption statute implicated either Article II, Section 3 or Article IX,
Section 1.109 The court did not focus long on the standing question. Although
Montana’s standing doctrine requires that a plaintiff show injury distinguishable
from injury to the public generally, such injury need not be exclusive to the
plaintiff.110 Reasoning that the plaintiffs would be more particularly affected by
the water discharges permitted by the exploration license because the plaintiffs

104. Mont. Env’t Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality (MEIC), 988 P.2d 1236, 1246 (Mont. 1999).
105. See Kadillak v. Anaconda Co., 602 P.2d 147 (Mont. 1979), superseded by statute, MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 75-1-102 (2015), as recognized in Park Cnty. Env’t Council v. Mont. Dep’t Env’t Quality, 477 P.3d 288 (Mont.
2020). The Kadillak court was tasked with interpretating the Montana Environmental Policy Act and refused to
give constitutional status to the statutory provision at issue on the basis of the constitutional environmental right.
See id. at 138.
106. 988 P.2d at 1237.
107. Id. at 1237–38.
108. Id. at 1238.
109. Id. at 1242.
110. Id.
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fished and recreated in those waters, the court concluded they had standing.111
The court also noted concern over “effectively immuniz[ing] the statute from
constitutional review” if standing were denied.112
In addressing the question of implication, the court had to develop its
environmental rights jurisprudence in two ways. First, it had to reconcile the
right in Article II, Section 3 with the right in Article IX, Section 1, because in
Montana, fundamental constitutional rights are subject to strict scrutiny review
while other state constitutional rights are subject to “middle-tier” scrutiny
review.113 While this rule would entail strict scrutiny for Article II, Section 3
analysis and middle-tier scrutiny for Article IX, Section 1 analysis, the court
determined that the constitutional environmental right, as embodied in those two
“interrelated and interdependent” constitutional provisions, is a fundamental
right, and that “any statute or rule which implicates that right must be strictly
scrutinized.”114 Perhaps because of the plain language of Article IX, Section 1,
the court concluded that both state and private action implicating either
constitutional provision must be evaluated under strict scrutiny review.115
Second, in articulating when the environmental right is implicated, the
court determined that the plaintiffs were not required to show “that public health
is threatened or that current water quality standards are affected to such an extent
that a significant impact has been had on either of the Landers Fork or Blackfoot
rivers.”116 Looking to the framers’ intent, the court concluded that the
constitutional environmental right “provide[s] language and protections which
are both anticipatory and preventative.”117 Beyond this, the MEIC court
provided no general information for concluding when the environmental right is
implicated. In deciding MEIC, the court determined that the environmental right
was implicated by the challenged exemption statute because (1) the proposed
pumping tests under the exploration license “would have added a known
carcinogen such as arsenic to the environment in concentrations greater than the
concentrations present in the receiving water,” and (2) DEQ had concluded that
discharges containing carcinogenic parameters greater than the concentrations
of those parameters in the receiving water has a significant impact, statutorily
requiring non-degradation review.118 We can hardly distill a generalizable
implication test for future cases from the court’s reasoning here.

111. Id. at 1243.
112. Id. at 1242.
113. Id. at 1244–45.
114. Id. at 1246.
115. Id. But see id. at 1250 (Leaphart, J., concurring) (“The conclusion that we will apply strict scrutiny
analysis to private action is dicta which, I submit, may well prove unworkable in the future.”).
116. Id. at 1249 (majority opinion).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Finally, while the lower court had not performed any scrutiny analysis
because it found the environmental right was not implicated, the MEIC court
resolved the case by declaring the exemption statute as-applied rather than
facially unconstitutional, because the environmental right “arbitrarily exclude[d]
certain ‘activities’ from non-degradation review with regard to the nature or
volume of the substances being discharged.”119 This is no scrutiny analysis at
all.120
While MEIC was a relatively groundbreaking decision at the time because
it held the environmental right in Montana’s constitution to be a fundamental
right, a comprehensive rights jurisprudence remained lacking until very recently.
After the MEIC decision, the Montana Supreme Court developed its
environmental rights jurisprudence in a series of smaller, scattered matters. In
2001, the court gave the environmental right some contour in the context of the
legal obligations of private parties.121 In Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of
Peed, two private parties had entered into a contract for the sale of a tract of land
upon which the buyers planned to build a motel or hotel.122 During the process
of surveying and subdividing the property, the seller became aware of potential
pollution issues with the groundwater supply for the property.123 A test well
would need to be drilled to determine whether the pollution situation exposed
the seller to extensive treatment costs as well as potential costs for spreading the
pollution.124 Faced with this potential financial liability “of an unquantifiable
nature,”125 the seller sued to rescind the contract.126 The lower court held, and
the Montana Supreme Court agreed, that the seller could rescind the contract on
the basis of mutual mistake of fact, impossibility, and impracticability of
performance grounds.127
While Cape-France appears to be a fairly routine contract case, the
Montana Supreme Court injected the constitutional environmental right into its
analysis as the “decisive” factor.128 The court explicitly noted that Article IX,
Section 1 applies the environmental right’s “protections and mandates,” as
119. Id. But see id. at 1250 (Leaphart, J., concurring) (“I do not see how the Court can logically avoid
declaring that the statute is unconstitutional on its face.”).
120. One contemporary commentator described it as such: “The Supreme Court in MEIC had rendered a
decision of monumental significance to the citizens of this state without fulfilling what ought to be even the
minimum standards of judicial decision making.” John L. Horwich, MEIC v. DEQ: An Inadequate Effort To
Address the Meaning of Montana’s Constitutional Environmental Provisions, 62 MONT. L. REV. 269, 270
(2001).
121. See Cape-France Enters. v. Est. of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001).
122. Id. at 1013.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1016.
126. Id. at 1012.
127. Id. at 1014, 1016.
128. Id. at 1016.
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discussed in MEIC, to private action.129 The court then concluded that the
contract required the seller to violate the Montana Constitution by requiring the
seller to drill the test well.130 Because there was “substantial evidence that
[drilling a test well] m[ight] cause significant degradation of uncontaminated
aquifers and pose serious public health risks,” the seller could not comply with
both its constitutional duty and the terms of the contract.131 Furthermore, the
court concluded that mandating specific performance of the contract would
involve the state in violating the public’s Article II, Section 3 environmental
right.132 Accordingly, the contract was unlawful and could be rescinded.133
The next developments in the constitutional environmental right came in
2007 through a pair of cases decided within two weeks of each other, which
sought to establish the existence of a constitutional tort pursuant to the
environmental right in Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1.134 The first
case, Sunburst School District No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., was a pollution case where
the defendant Texaco had operated a gasoline refinery just outside the town of
Sunburst, Montana, that had heavily polluted the surrounding soil and
subsurface groundwater during the first half of the twentieth century.135 The
pollution was known to Texaco as early as 1955, and for a variety of reasons,
Texaco made minimal cleanup efforts over the years.136 Texaco finally proposed
a cleanup solution of “monitored natural attenuation” (“MNA”) in 2003 to
remediate the groundwater, which was contaminated with a known carcinogen,
benzene.137 A cleanup based on MNA meant that Texaco would simply monitor
“the level of benzene in the groundwater with the expectation that the
environment w[ould] naturally degrade the benzene over a period of [twenty to
one hundred] years” to safe levels.138 This option would cost Texaco
approximately $1 million, instead of potentially more than $30 million dollars,
to perform active remediation.139 DEQ, which was tasked with approving
Texaco’s remediation plan, proposed the MNA for public comment in 2003.140
Sunburst’s litigation against Texaco in this case started two years prior in
2001 and alleged numerous causes of action, including trespass, strict liability

129. Id. at 1017.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Shammel v. Canyon Res. Corp., 167 P.3d 886 (Mont. 2007); Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco,
Inc., 165 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2007).
135. 165 P.3d. at 1083.
136. Id. at 1083–84.
137. Id. at 1084.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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for abnormally dangerous activity, public nuisance, wrongful occupation of
property, constructive fraud, and violation of the constitutional environmental
right.141 What matters for the purposes of this Article is that when the case went
to trial and the jury awarded damages against Texaco, the trial “court instructed
the jury to award damages if Texaco had violated Sunburst’s constitutional right
to a clean and healthful environment.”142 The jury awarded the plaintiffs a single
amount of $226,000 for private nuisance, public nuisance, and constitutional
tort, among other damages not relevant for our purposes.143
On appeal, Texaco argued that Montana’s constitutional environmental
right did not support a cause of action for money damages—in other words, that
the right was not self-executing—thus challenging the $226,000 damages
award.144 By adhering closely to the “long-standing principle that courts should
avoid constitutional issues wherever possible,”145 the Sunburst court resolved
Texaco’s claim without addressing the question of whether Montana’s
constitutional environmental right is self-executing.146 In doing so, the court
relied on an earlier, non-environmental rights case where it concluded that “the
absence of any other remedy supported the establishment of a constitutional
tort.”147 The court then reasoned that because the plaintiffs had adequate
statutory or common-law remedies, the trial court had erred in directing the jury
to award damages for a constitutional tort under the environmental right
provisions.148 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed this conclusion in Shammel
v. Canyon Resources Corp., decided two weeks after Sunburst.149 Thus, Article
II, Section 3 and Article IV, Section 1 do not create an independent cause of
action for a constitutional environmental tort when a claimant has other remedies
available.150

141. Id.
142. Id. at 1085.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1092.
145. Cape-France Enters. v. Est. of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011, 1018 (Mont. 2001) (Leaphart, J., concurring).
146. Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1093.
147. Id. (citing Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128, 137 (Mont. 2002)).
148. Id. Because the jury instructions substantially reflected the jury instructions proposed by Texaco, the
court also concluded that no remand was required on the $226,000 damages award. Id. at 1094–95. It is important
to note that the court’s reasoning in Sunburst reflects a logical error known as denying the antecedent. See Brett
Gaul, Denying the Antecedent, in BAD ARGUMENTS: 100 OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FALLACIES IN WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY 46–47 (Robert Arp et al. eds., 2018). Even if the lack of availability of adequate remedies at
statutory or common law entails that finding a constitutional tort is appropriate, it does not follow that the
availability of adequate remedies at statutory or common law entails that finding a constitutional tort is
inappropriate. See id.
149. Shammel v. Canyon Res. Corp., 167 P.3d 886, 888 (Mont. 2007) (“[W]here adequate alternative
remedies exist under the common law or statute, the constitutional right . . . does not support a cause of action
for money damages between two private parties.”).
150. See id.
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Five years after the decisions in Sunburst and Shammel, the Montana
Supreme Court was called again to develop its constitutional environmental
right, this time in the context of Montana’s Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”)
and the underdeveloped strict scrutiny analysis suggested in MEIC.151 Northern
Plains Resource Council v. Board of Land Commissioners involved a dispute
over what government actions were required under MEPA prior to executing
leases with a private coal company to strip mine state lands for coal.152 As a
general matter, “MEPA is essentially procedural and does not demand any
particular substantive decisions.”153 MEPA simply “requires State agencies to
review, through an EIS [Environmental Impact Statement], major actions that
significantly affect the quality of the human environment so that the agencies
may make informed decisions.”154 Thus, the issue in Northern Plains was
whether the State Land Board, responsible for executing the coal lease at issue,
was exempt from conducting an EIS prior to executing the coal lease under the
theory that MEPA’s provision allowing such an exemption was unconstitutional
under Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1.155
The Northern Plains court simultaneously reaffirmed and muddled some
matters addressed in MEIC. First, the court reaffirmed that the right to a clean
and healthful environment is a fundamental right and that any statute that
impacts that right is subject to strict scrutiny.156 The court also reaffirmed its
strict scrutiny framework by specifying that strict scrutiny requires “the State to
provide a compelling interest for” the exemption provision’s existence.157 But
the court muddled the issue of which level of scrutiny applies to Article IX,
Section 1 challenges by concluding that “‘middle-tiered’ scrutiny is not called
for here, because the statute does not adversely impact constitutional rights
provided for outside of Article II, such as the provisions of Article IX . . . .”158
Despite all this discussion, the court decided Northern Plains on
implication, not strict scrutiny, grounds. In essence, because the leases at issue
only granted the coal-mining company the exclusive right to apply for state
permits to actually commence mining activities,159 “the act of issuing the leases
did not impact or implicate the right to a clean and healthful environment
. . . .”160 Yet again, the Northern Plains court provided no general framework
for evaluating when the environmental right is implicated.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

N. Plains Res. Council v. Mont. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 288 P.3d 169 (Mont. 2012).
See id. at 171–72.
Id. at 173.
Id. MEPA, therefore, parallels the federal National Environmental Policy Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
288 P.3d at 172.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 174.
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In December 2020, the Montana Supreme Court finally performed a more
complete implication and scrutiny analysis of a statute challenged under Article
II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1.161 Park County Environmental Council
v. Montana Department of Environmental Quality involved another citizens’
challenge to a mining exploration license granted by DEQ to a private mining
company.162 On appeal, the court determined, and DEQ conceded, that the
environmental impact analyses were insufficient in several respects under
MEPA.163 The relevant issue in the case was the matter of appropriate remedies
for a MEPA violation, specifically the status of the exploration license while the
case was remanded to DEQ to conduct the proper environmental impact
analyses.164 Of crucial importance was the fact that MEPA had been amended
in 2011 by the Montana legislature to prohibit equitable relief for MEPA
violations.165 It was those amendments that the Park County plaintiffs
challenged as violating the environmental right contained in Article II, Section
3 and Article IX, Section 1.
With respect to its implication analysis, the Park County court developed
two lines of thought. First, the court reexamined the text and history of the
environmental right amendments and again emphasized the “preventative”
nature of the right.166 The court recognized the importance of the remedy of
equitable relief to prevent potential harm,167 and relying on the constitutional
text, concluded that “equitable relief must play a role in the constitutional
directive.”168 Second, the court determined that MEPA, although enacted a year
prior to the ratification of the constitutional environmental right, “serves a role
in enabling the Legislature to fulfill its constitutional obligation to prevent
environmental harms infringing upon Montanans’ right to a clean and healthful
environment.”169 Considering the 2011 MEPA amendments in light of these two
conclusions, the court determined that the amendments “constituted a significant
departure from MEPA as it existed since its enactment less than a year prior to

161. Park Cnty. Env’t Council v. Mont. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 477 P.3d 288 (Mont. 2020).
162. See id. at 294–95.
163. Id. at 302.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 303–04 (noting “the constitutional text’s unambiguous reliance on preventative measures”
indicates that “Montanans have a right . . . to be free of [environmental harm] in the first place” and that “[t]he
delegates’ adamant statements during the convention informed [the court’s] conclusion that these provisions
were meant to be ‘both anticipatory and preventative’”).
167. See id. at 304 (“[W]e note that equitable relief, unlike monetary damages, can avert harms that would
have otherwise arisen.”).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 305; see also id. at 306 (“The undeniable proximity in time and substance between these two
lawmaking efforts informs our conclusion that the constitutional obligations at issue encompass the forwardlooking mechanisms found within MEPA.”).
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Montana’s constitutional Convention.”170 The 2011 amendments made DEQ’s
MEPA error “essentially irreversible” with “the cost of that error accru[ing] to
Montanans’ constitutionally-guaranteed environmental rights.”171 Therefore,
the 2011 amendments to MEPA implicated the constitutional environmental
rights provisions.172 While this provides more detail regarding implication than
MEIC, it still falls short of providing any general framework for evaluating
whether a statute implicates the constitutional environmental right in Montana.
Turning to the strict scrutiny analysis, none of the parties even contested
that the 2011 MEPA amendments were “narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest.”173 Yet the court went on to determine that they
were unconstitutional under Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1.174
The interesting part of the court’s scrutiny analysis was therefore not in applying
strict scrutiny to the challenged statute, but in refusing to balance the
constitutional environmental right against the defendant mining company’s
alleged property rights, which are also found in the Montana Constitution.175
The court noted that MEPA itself does not restrict the mining company’s use of
its private property.176 Instead, the underlying substantive environmental statute
governing mining and reclamation in Montana, the Metal Mine Reclamation Act
(“MMRA”), restricts the use of private property for mining.177 The court then
noted that government regulation of the mining industry had never been held to
unduly burden private property rights.178 Therefore, vacating the exploration
permit while DEQ conducted a proper MEPA analysis amounted to nothing
more than requiring the mining company to “undergo the same wait now it
should have experienced before,” and thus “[t]here [wa]s no argument that
simply waiting for DEQ to properly review and act upon an application
constitutes an infringement of property rights.”179 While there was no balancing
of property rights against the constitutional right in Park County, because no
property rights were burdened, the court distinguished in dicta that “[b]alancing
may be appropriate when a case presents an irreconcilable conflict between the
co-equal rights of the parties.”180 In sum, the court held the 2011 amendments
to be facially unconstitutional.181
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 306.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 307–08.
Id. at 309.
Id.
See MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 17, 29.
Park Cnty., 477 P.3d at 308.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 309–10.
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The most recent Montana constitutional environmental right case was
decided in early 2021.182 There, the Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principle that determined Northern Plains and further explained the importance
of the nature of available remedies at issue in Park County. Clark Fork Coal v.
Montana Department of Natural Resources & Conservation is a complicated,
twenty-year-long environmental case spanning both federal and state
environmental litigation.183 In short, the challenged statute excluded the citizenplaintiffs from raising certain water quality objections to parts of a “beneficial
use” water permit issued under the Montana Water Use Act (“MWUA”) in
connection with plans for a mining operation. Raising such an objection would
trigger a statutory requirement on the permit-holder to show the safety of the
proposed water discharges, but only DEQ or a local water quality district could
raise the objection pursuant to the relevant statute.184 The plaintiffs alleged that
this deprived them of “an adequate remedy to protect affected area surface
waters from degradation by advance review.”185
First, in further developing Park County on the issue of remedies, the court
concluded that the environmental right did not entitle the plaintiffs “to any
particular type or means of remedy.”186 The court looked to other statutes, in
particular MEPA and the MMRA, to evaluate whether the plaintiffs, through
DEQ, had an opportunity to object to the proposed water discharges prior to the
discharges occurring.187 Second, appealing to the rationale in Northern Plains,
the court found that MEPA review under the MMRA would be triggered prior
to the occurrence of any of the water discharges described in the “beneficial use”
permit.188 Indeed, the beneficial use permit did not authorize any mining-related
activity that could degrade the waters at issue.189 Because the plaintiffs still
possessed independent MEPA and MMRA remedies for advance environmental
review and protection of the waters subject to the beneficial use permit, their
environmental right was not implicated, and strict scrutiny analysis of the statute
limiting the class of objectors to DEQ and local water quality districts did not
apply.190
Montana’s case law demonstrates the challenge that a constitutional
environmental right might pose for a court. Unlike the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, which could look to the trust language in its constitutional provision, the
182.
2021).
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See generally Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Conservation, 481 P.3d 198 (Mont.
See id. at 201–12.
See id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 223–24.
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Montana Supreme Court lacks similar textual guidance upon which it can rely
to develop the contours of its constitutional environmental right. Implication and
scrutiny analysis are certainly available doctrines to import into the
environmental rights analysis, but it is difficult to articulate a generalized test
for when government (or private) action implicates the environmental right. This
is all the more troubling when we consider that implication, at least in the
Montana case law thus far, is generally determinative of the environmental rights
challenge. Furthermore, while Montana treats its constitutional environmental
right as a fundamental right, the Montana Supreme Court, like the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, clearly anticipated future conflicts between the environmental
right and other important rights (such as property rights).
The case law in Pennsylvania and Montana demonstrates the relevance of
how the constitutional environmental right is drafted. Hawaii has yet a third way
of drafting a constitutional environmental right, which has resulted in a third
kind of environmental rights jurisprudence.
C. HAWAII
1.

The Constitutional Text

Hawaii’s constitutional environmental right is contained in Article XI,
Section 9 of the Hawaiian Constitution and states:
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined
by laws relating to environmental quality, including control of pollution and
conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources. Any person
may enforce this right against any party, public or private, through appropriate
legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided
by law.191

Article XI of the Hawaiian Constitution contains provisions governing the
“Conservation, Control and Development of Resources,” so the environmental
right is not among the state’s fundamental rights in Article I.192
2.

The Case Law

As early as the 1980s, the Hawaii legislature seemed to recognize that
Section 9 “ha[d] given the public standing to use the courts to enforce laws
intended to protect the environment.”193 However, that right had little efficacy
191. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
192. See id. art. I, § 2 (“All persons are free by nature and are equal in their inherent and inalienable rights.
Among these rights are the enjoyment of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and the acquiring and
possessing of property. These rights cannot endure unless the people recognize their corresponding obligations
and responsibilities.”).
193. Kahana Sunset Owners Ass’n v. Maui Cnty. Council, 948 P.2d 122, 124 (Haw. 1997) (quoting Act 80,
§ 1, 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws 104, 104).

December 2022]

THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE

149

until the Hawaii Supreme Court revitalized it in a land-use case in 2010.194 In
County of Hawaii v. Ala Loop Homeowners, a new charter school acquired
agriculturally zoned land upon which it intended to build its new campus.195 A
dispute arose between the charter school and neighboring residents regarding
whether the charter school was required to obtain a “special use permit” under
state law, Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 205 (“Chapter 205”).196 The Section
9 issue that went up to the Hawaii Supreme Court was whether the neighboring
residents had a private right of action to enforce the Chapter 205 permit
requirement against the charter school.197
As a preliminary matter, the Hawaii Supreme Court examined an earlier
lower court decision that addressed the Chapter 205 private right of action
issue.198 In Pono v. Molokai Ranch, Ltd., the Hawaii Intermediate Court of
Appeals (“ICA”) applied a three-factor test to conclude that Chapter 205 did not
provide a private right of action for individual enforcement.199 The ICA reasoned
that (1) Chapter 205 does not explicitly provide for a private right of action; (2)
there was no indication of legislative intent, either explicit or implicit, to provide
a private right of action to enforce Chapter 205; and (3) recognizing a private
right of action would not be consistent with the purposes of Chapter 205.200 The
Ala Loop court reaffirmed the Pono three-factor test for determining whether the
legislature intended to create a private right of action, but also concluded that
the Pono court erred by failing to examine whether the state constitution created
a private right of action to enforce Chapter 205.201
After establishing this distinction, the Hawaii Supreme Court went on to
address three matters for determining whether the state constitution granted the
Ala Loop plaintiffs a private right of action to enforce Chapter 205’s permit
requirements. First, the plain language of the Hawaii constitutional right defines
the content of the right in terms of state statutory “law relating to environmental
quality,” so the court had to determine whether Chapter 205 is a “law relating to
environmental quality” and therefore within the scope of the constitutional
environmental right.202 Because the stated purpose of Chapter 205 is “to
preserve, protect and encourage the development of land in the State for those
194. See generally Cnty. of Haw. v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 235 P.3d 1103 (Haw. 2010), abrogated on
other grounds by Tax Found. v. State, 439 P.3d 127 (Haw. 2019).
195. Id. at 1105.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1115.
198. See Pono v. Molokai Ranch, Ltd., 194 P.3d 1126, 1149–52 (Haw. Ct. App. 2008), abrogated by Ala
Loop, 235 P.3d 1103.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Ala Loop, 235 P.3d at 1120.
202. Id. at 1121; see also id. at 1122 (“[A]rticle XI, section 9 does not itself define the substantive content
of the right to a clean and healthful environment, but rather leaves it to the legislature to determine.”).
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uses to which they are best suited for the public welfare,” and because the
provisions of Chapter 205 “expressly require consideration of issues relating to
the preservation or conservation of natural resources,” the court determined that
Chapter 205 is a “law relating to environmental quality.”203
Second, the court had to address the more general question of whether the
Section 9 right is self-executing, or whether it requires implementing
legislation.204 To evaluate this issue, the court looked to the plain language of
the provision as well as the constitutional history of the amendment.205 The court
reasoned that the constitutional language, providing that the right is “subject to
reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law,” does not suggest
legislative action is needed before the right can be enforced.206 As to the
provision’s constitutional history, the court noted that the Constitutional
Committee stated that “this important right deserves enforcement and has
removed the standing to sue barriers” and “adds no new duties but does add
potential enforcers.”207 The court also noted that the Hawaii legislature seemed
to believe that the right is self-executing,208 a conclusion supported by much
scholarly writing.209 Hence, the court found that Section 9 is self-executing.210
Third, and finally, the Hawaii Supreme Court had to determine whether
there were any provisions in Chapter 205 by which the legislature imposed
“reasonable limitations and regulations” on the right, preventing private parties
from bringing a cause of action.211 The charter school claimed that section 20512 delegated enforcement of Chapter 205 to the counties, thereby precluding a
private right of action.212 In setting the parameters of what constitutes
“reasonable limitations,” the court rejected the charter school’s position, relying
on the constitutional history, which demonstrated that the framers intended that
private enforcement would complement, not supplant, government enforcement
of the right.213 Thus, the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that the neighboring
landowners had a private right of action—also confusingly called “standing” by
the court214—to enforce the Chapter 205 permit requirement against the charter
school.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 1121–22.
See id. at 1122.
Id. at 1125–27.
Id. at 1125.
Id. (quoting H. 10-77, 1st Proc. of the Const. Convention of 1978, at 689–690 (Haw. 1980)).
Id. at 1127 (citing Act 80, § 1, 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws 104, 104).
Id. at 1128 (listing scholarly articles concluding that Article XI, Section 9 is self-executing).
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1129–30.
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1137.
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The next major development of the Hawaii constitutional environmental
right occurred in the mid-2010s, when environmental groups started to intervene
in electricity cases on the basis of Section 9.215 Three electricity cases advanced
a different theory of the Section 9 right than that in Ala Loop. Ala Loop was
about private citizens becoming enforcers of environmental statutes through a
private right of action established by Section 9. In the electricity cases, the
Section 9 right was invoked in the context of due process claims and private
citizens’ claims to intervene in administrative proceedings.
The first electricity case, In re Application Maui Electric Co. (MECO),
involved the execution of a new power purchase agreement (“PPA”) between
Maui Electric, an electric utility company, and Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar
Company (“HC&S”), an electricity producer.216 Under the relevant Hawaii
statute, Maui Electric could recover the costs of electricity production from
consumers under a PPA so long as the agreement was approved by the Public
Utilities Commission (“PUC”).217 Under the proposed PPA, Maui Electric
would continue to purchase electricity from an HC&S plant that burned a
number of fossil fuels, including coal and petroleum.218 The Sierra Club moved
to intervene in the PUC proceedings concerning the proposed PPA on behalf of
itself and its members:
Sierra Club asserted a fundamental due process right to participate in a
hearing on the grounds that the [PPA] would impact Sierra Club’s members’
health, aesthetic, and recreational interests. Sierra Club also asserted its
organizational interest in reducing Hawaii’s dependence on imported fossil
fuels and advancing a clean energy grid.219

The PUC denied Sierra Club’s motion to intervene,220 and the ICA dismissed
Sierra Club’s appeal.221
Because Hawaii courts only have jurisdiction to review PUC decisions
pursuant to a statute, Sierra Club’s due process claim had to be analyzed within
a statutory jurisdictional analysis.222 Because the jurisdictional issue adds
complexity, I focus only on the court’s due process analysis, which occurred
within the jurisdictional analysis. The Hawaii Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that Sierra Club had asserted a due process right grounded in Section
9 and was entitled to a hearing on the basis of that right.223
215. See generally In re Application Maui Elec. Co., Ltd. (MECO), 408 P.3d 1 (Haw. 2017); Matter of Gas
Co., 465 P.3d 633 (Haw. 2020); Matter of Haw. Elec. Light Co., Inc., 445 P.3d 673 (Haw. 2019).
216. 408 P.3d at 5.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 7.
221. Id. at 8.
222. See id. at 9–10.
223. Id. at 23.
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First in its due process analysis, the court determined that Sierra Club had
a protected property interest, a benefit to which it was legitimately entitled,
based on the substantive right to a clean and healthful environment established
by Section 9 and “defined by existing law relating to environmental quality.”224
Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 269 (“Chapter 269”), which required the PUC
to recognize the need to reduce reliance on fossil fuels when carrying out its
duties, was the relevant “law relating to environmental quality.”225 In coming to
this conclusion, the court made three observations. First, the Hawaii legislature
amended Chapter 269 in 2011 to make it mandatory for the PUC to recognize
the need to reduce reliance on fossil fuels when carrying out its duties.226
Second, the court concluded that the legislative history demonstrated that “a
primary purpose of the amended law was to require the Commission to consider
the hidden and long-term costs of reliance on fossil fuels . . . .”227 Lastly, the
court noted that Chapter 269 also prescribed renewable portfolio standards,
leading to the conclusion that it was “precisely the type of ‘law relating to
environmental quality’” to which Section 9 refers.228 As a note of caution,
however, and in response to the dissent’s arguments, the court warned that the
Section 9 “right is not a freestanding interest in general aesthetic and
environmental values.”229
Second in its due process analysis, the court determined that Sierra Club
was entitled to a hearing on its due process right. The Hawaii Supreme Court
used a three-factor analysis similar to that employed by federal courts to
determine whether the administrative procedures comported with constitutional
due process.230 Those factors are: “(1) the private interest which will be affected;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
actually used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or alternative
procedural safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest, including the burden
that additional procedural safeguards would entail.”231 Notably, in addressing
the private interest factor, the court stated that the private interest was the Section
9 right, which includes “that explicit consideration be given to reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions in Commission decision-making” as provided in
Chapter 269.232 In essence, the Hawaii Supreme Court continued developing the
theory of Ala Loop, where the constitutional environmental right is a mechanism
224. Id. at 13; see also id. (“This substantive right is a legitimate entitlement stemming from and shaped by
independent sources of state law, and is thus a property interest protected by due process.”).
225. Id. at 15.
226. Id. at 14.
227. Id. at 15.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 16.
230. See id. at 17; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
231. MECO, 408 P.3d at 17.
232. Id.
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for individuals to hold governmental bodies, as opposed to private parties, to
their statutory environmental duties.
Having established the due process analysis, the court still had to decide
whether Sierra Club had standing as part of the court’s jurisdictional analysis. I
only mention this because the standing analysis under Hawaii’s jurisdictional
analysis for reviewing agency actions is different from what the court called
“standing” in Ala Loop. This highlights a distinction between cases brought
directly to assert a private right of action grounded in the Section 9 right (with
that right defined by statute) and those brought more indirectly through a due
process claim. In sum, the court concluded that Sierra Club had standing to bring
its due process claim, and thus the court had jurisdiction to review the PUC’s
actions.233 The court then remanded the case to the ICA for further
proceedings.234
Two similar, quite recent electricity cases soon followed the MECO
decision.235 The first, Matter of Hawaii Electric Light Co. (HELCO) involved
Life of the Land (“LOL”), an environmental nonprofit seeking to intervene in
the PUC’s proceedings regarding the approval of an amended PPA between
Hawaii Electric Light Company (“HELCO”) and Hu Honua Bioenergy, LLC
(“Hu Honua”).236 The terms of the PPA would obligate Hu Honua to construct
a new biomass facility and would obligate HELCO to purchase electricity from
that facility.237 The PUC approved the PPA without a hearing.238 LOL was
granted limited participant status during the PUC’s proceedings; however, LOL
claimed that PUC failed to consider greenhouse gas emissions in deciding to
approve the PPA and denied LOL due process in protecting its interest in a clean
and healthful environment by limiting LOL’s status in the proceedings.239
As in MECO, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed the due process issue
within its jurisdictional analysis, since HELCO, Hu Honua, and the PUC argued
that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the PUC’s decision to approve the
PPA.240 The court’s analysis largely parallels its analysis in the MECO decision,
because LOL sought to protect its property interest in a clean and healthful
environment as defined by Chapter 269.241
After concluding it possessed jurisdiction to review the PUC’s approval of
the PPA, the court examined the merits of LOL’s appeal. In its discussion, the
233. Id. at 23.
234. Id.
235. See Matter of Gas Co., 465 P.3d 633 (Haw. 2020); Matter of Haw. Elec. Light Co., Inc., 445 P.3d 673
(Haw. 2019).
236. 445 P.3d at 677.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 683–94.
241. Id. at 688.
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court looked at whether the PUC had fulfilled its statutory duties under Chapter
269 to explicitly consider the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.242
Ultimately, the court concluded that the PUC did not demonstrate “express
consideration” of the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in its evaluation of
the PPA, nor did the PUC address the hidden and long-term environmental and
public health costs of reliance on energy produced at the biomass facility under
the PPA.243 On this ground, the Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the case to the
PUC to fulfill its statutory duties by considering the reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions in evaluating the PPA.244 The court also concluded that LOL was
entitled to a hearing on its right to a clean and healthful environment.245
The most recent electricity case taken up by the Hawaii Supreme Court,
Matter of Gas Co., involved another PPA approved by the PUC and the
intervention of LOL and Ka Lei Maile Ali’I (“KLM”) in the proceedings.246 The
PPA at issue would have passed the cost of two recently established liquid
natural gas projects onto consumers as part of the electricity producer’s move
away from synthetic natural gas.247 As it had under the facts of HELCO, the PUC
denied LOL and KLM’s motion to intervene but allowed them to participate on
a limited basis during its evaluation of the PPA.248 After addressing the standing
issue,249 the court evaluated whether PUC fulfilled its statutory duties under
Chapter 269. The novel claim in Gas Co. was that the PUC was not required to
consider greenhouse gas emissions outside of the state of Hawaii under Chapter
269.250 The Hawaii Supreme Court disagreed.251 In further refining the contours
of the PUC’s statutory duties, the court found that the plain language of Chapter
269 did not limit the PUC’s consideration of greenhouse gas emissions to only
those occurring in Hawaii,252 determining that the statute’s primary purpose was
to require the PUC to consider “hidden and long-term costs” of using fossil
fuels.253 The PUC “disregarded any possible [greenhouse gas] emission leakage
from imported” liquid natural gas, and such disregard was contrary to law.254
242. Id. at 695.
243. Id. at 696.
244. Id. at 697.
245. Id. at 698.
246. See 465 P.3d 633, 636 (Haw. 2020).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. 645–46. As it turns out, Hawaii has two different standing tests, both of which are different than the
“standing” analysis performed in Ala Loop. One test is for when an appellant has been entirely denied
participation in the agency proceedings; the other test is for when an appellant has been granted limited
participation in the agency proceeding but appeals the denial of full intervenor status. See id.
250. See id. at 647.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 648.
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This failure by the PUC also violated LOL and KLM’s due process rights,
because LOL and KLM’s limited participation status prevented them from being
heard on the matter of out-of-state greenhouse gas emissions incidental to the
importation of liquid natural gas.255
These three cases open a significant avenue for citizen involvement in the
electricity sector in Hawaii, although that involvement is limited to holding the
PUC to its statutory duties rather than commanding a particular outcome from
the PUC with respect to any particular PPA. It is also unclear how the Hawaii
Supreme Court will handle a (likely inevitable) argument from the PUC that a
fossil-fuel-oriented PPA is still overall “in the public interest.” That is to say, as
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has put it, the PUC has duties to act in the
interests of general welfare, duties that may conflict with denying a fossil-fueloriented PPA. We do not know how the Hawaii Supreme Court will address
such a defense of a PPA, which is fossil-fuel- and greenhouse-gas-emission
intensive. To the extent these seem like climate victories, only time will tell
whether they will produce positive, substantive environmental outcomes.
Pennsylvania, Montana, and Hawaii present three different kinds of
“successful” constitutional environmental rights jurisprudences. The nature of
each right depends significantly on the respective constitutional text. The
remaining two states, Massachusetts and Illinois, do not have similarly
“successful” constitutional rights jurisprudence, though some familiar themes
will arise.
D. MASSACHUSETTS
1.

The Constitutional Text

The most verbose of the state constitutional environmental rights,
Massachusetts’ right reads:
The people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom from
excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic
qualities of their environment; and the protection of the people in their right
to the conservation, development and utilization of the agricultural, mineral,
forest, water, air and other natural resources is hereby declared to be a public
purpose.
The general court shall have the power to enact legislation necessary or
expedient to protect such rights.
In the furtherance of the foregoing powers, the general court shall have the
power to provide for the taking, upon payment of just compensation therefor,
or for the acquisition by purchase or otherwise, of lands and easements or such

255. Id. at 650–51.
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other interests therein as may be deemed necessary to accomplish these
purposes.
Lands and easements taken or acquired for such purposes shall not be used
for other purposes or otherwise disposed of except by laws enacted by a two
thirds vote, taken by yeas and nays, of each branch of the general court.256

The constitutional environment right is contained in the Articles of
Amendment as Article XCVII, so it is not part of Massachusetts’ fundamental
and inalienable constitutional rights.
2.

The Case Law

The first time the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a serious
look at Article XCVII was in Opinion of the Justices to the Senate in 1981.257
At that time, the Massachusetts legislature was considering enacting a bill to
provide “immediate certainty ‘as to titles to certain lands lying within the city of
Boston, and bordering on or near the waters of the commonwealth.’”258 One
important legal effect of the proposed bill was to extinguish vestigial rights of
the commonwealth in certain tidelands that benefitted private landowners, so as
to improve the marketability of those private titles and aid the efforts to
rejuvenate Boston.259 The constitutional rights question posed to the
Massachusetts Justices was whether the bill required a two-thirds vote by the
legislature pursuant to the final clause of the constitutional environmental rights
provision.260
In the 1981 opinion, the court made two determinations regarding the scope
of the two-thirds clause. First, the language of the two-thirds clause applies to
“lands and easements” taken or acquired by the commonwealth for the
environmental purposes articulated in the constitutional right prior to the
ratification of the constitutional right.261 To determine that a constitutional
amendment has retroactive effect goes in part to recognizing the supremacy of
the constitution. Second, the court determined that the two-thirds clause applies
only to lands and easements, and not to lesser property interests.262 Thus, the
court concluded that to the extent the proposed bill would extinguish vestigial

256. MASS. CONST. art. XCVII. Article XCVII of the Massachusetts Constitution amended Article XLIX.
See id. art. XLIX, amended by id. art. XCVII. While the text of the constitutional right is located in Article XLIX,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refers to the constitutional provision as Article XCVII, so that is
the terminology I adopt for this Article. See id.
257. 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1107 (Mass. 1981).
258. Id. at 1096.
259. See id. at 1096–98.
260. See id. at 1107.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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rights that qualified as easements, a two-thirds vote of the legislature would be
required; otherwise, the two-thirds clause would not apply.263
Since 1981, the development of the Massachusetts constitutional
environmental right has been largely limited to determining what “lands and
easements” means in the two-thirds clause. In 1987, the Massachusetts Appeals
Court determined that a one-year seasonal permit, revocable by the issuing
agency at will, to carry out a cross-country skiing program on state lands under
the supervision of the state agency did not constitute a disposition of lands or
easements requiring a two-thirds vote of the legislature.264 In 2005, it was
determined that when private parties exercise their easement rights over
commonwealth land—rights established in the deeds granting the land to the
commonwealth—there is no disposition of lands or easements requiring a twothirds vote of the legislature.265 In another 2005 decision, the court also
determined that when a town acquires lands as general corporate property under
the deed, a later town vote to put those lands to conservation purposes with no
further legal action (e.g., the recording of such purposes) does not make the sale
of those lands subject to the two-thirds vote requirement under the constitutional
environmental right.266
In essence, the two-thirds-clause analysis requires determining whether
land or an easement is acquired for “the conservation, development and
utilization of the agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other natural
resources,”267 and whether the land is being “disposed of” by some government
action. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts gave the former element a
thorough examination in 2013 in Mahajan v. Department of Environmental
Protection. There, the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) issued
a license pursuant to statutory authority to the Boston Redevelopment Authority
(“BRA”) to redevelop a section of land owned by the BRA on the seaward end
of Long Warf in Boston, the “project site.”268 The BRA took title to the project
site in 1970 pursuant to its eminent domain powers as part of an urban renewal
plan.269
The court was faced with the question of whether that 1970 taking was a
taking for Article XCVII purposes. Importantly, the court rejected an earlier
attorney general opinion that concluded that “the vast majority of land taken for
any public purpose” could become subject to Article XCVII and the two-thirds

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 1108.
See Miller v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Env’t Mgmt., 503 N.E.2d 666, 667–68 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
See Haugh v. Simms, 835 N.E.2d 1131, 1137–38 (Mass. 2005).
See Bd. of Selectmen v. Lindsay, 829 N.E.2d 1105, 1108–10 (Mass. 2005).
Mahajan v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 984 N.E.2d 821, 827 (Mass. 2013).
Id. at 823.
Id. at 824–25.
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vote requirement.270 The court distinguished between land taken that
incidentally serves the Article XCVII purpose and land taken for those
purposes.271 To clarify the latter’s meaning, the court recognized that the
constitutional language was derived from the doctrine of “public prior use,”
which states that “public lands devoted to one [and only one] public use cannot
be diverted to another inconsistent public use without plain and explicit
legislation authorizing the diversion.”272 The court ultimately concluded that just
because the urban renewal plan simply called for a variety of vague uses, some
of which were consistent with Article XCVII purposes, that did not mean that
the land was taken for Article XCVII purposes.273 Accordingly, the taking did
not trigger the two-thirds clause.274
The court further concluded that the license issued to the BRA from DEP
did not constitute a “disposition” within the meaning of Article XCVII, either.275
This conclusion was based on the fact that the statute under which the license
was issued specified that the grant of a license did not convey a property right,
and that the license was largely a certification that the project complied with
statutory rules rather than a transfer of legal control of the land at issue.276
More recently, the court decided a case where the two-thirds clause was
triggered, reaffirming the public prior use doctrine as the appropriate standard
for determining when Article XCVII applies.277 In Smith v. City of Westfield, the
land at issue was a municipal parkland which had not been taken under eminent
domain, nor was there any recordation of restriction on the use of the land with
the registry of deeds.278 The City of Westfield wanted to build an elementary
school on the parkland, which had been a public park for more than sixty
years.279 The court had to address the issue of whether a recordation of
conservation for Article XCVII purposes was necessary to bring a parcel of land
within the scope of the two-thirds clause, and if not, how such designations
should be determined.280
First, the court clarified its prior holdings in Board of Selectmen of Hanson
v. Lindsay and Mahajan. In short, neither a town vote (as in Selectmen of
Hanson) nor an urban renewal project (as in Mahajan) is sufficient to manifest
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Id. at 828–29.
Id.
Id. at 830 (quoting Robbins v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577, 579 (Mass. 1969)).
Id. at 830–33.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 833.
Id.
See Smith v. City of Westfield, 82 N.E.3d 390 (Mass. 2017).
Id. at 392.
Id. at 392–93.
Id. at 396–97.
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an intent to reserve land forever as a public park.281 However, in City of
Westfield, because the city took federal funds “to rehabilitate the playground
with the statutory proviso that, by doing so, the city surrendered all ability to
convert the playground to a use other than public outdoor recreation without the
approval of the Secretary [of the Interior],” the court determined that there was
intent to reserve the playground as a public park.282 Therefore, a two-thirds vote
of the legislature was required for the city to convert the playground to an
elementary school. Such a requirement, however, did not “prohibit[] the
construction of the new school”; it “merely order[ed] the [c]ity to comply with
the law before it proceed[ed].”283
While the Massachusetts cases have revolved around developing the twothirds clause of the Massachusetts constitutional environmental right, two other
cases have also addressed the right more generally. In the first case, Enos v.
Secretary of Environmental Affairs,284 the plaintiffs were residents who lived
near a site proposed for the construction of a new sewage facility.285 The
Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Affairs had issued a certificate of
compliance for the construction of the new sewage facility, which the plaintiffs
sought to have declared invalid, alleging that it would “impair their use and
enjoyment of their properties and of the Eel River, diminish the value of their
properties, and impair the function of their private septic systems and wells.”286
The certificate was issued after the Secretary had undertaken the statutorily
required Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act (“MEPA II”) assessment,
which requires all state agencies to “review, evaluate, and determine the impact
on the natural environment of all works, projects or activities conducted by them
and . . . use all practicable means and measures to minimize the damage to the
environment.”287 The court was called on to decide whether the plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the Secretary’s MEPA II assessment of the sewage
treatment project.288 The Enos decision concluded that there was no duty owed
directly to the plaintiffs that would establish their standing to challenge the
Secretary’s MEPA II assessment.289 There was no legislative intent to allow the
plaintiffs standing, and the court also expressed concern that “[t]o grant standing
based on MEPA[II]’s ultimate goal of the protection of the environment would
allow suit in almost every project within MEPA[II]’s jurisdiction, based on
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288.
289.

Id. at 402.
Id.
Id. at 395.
731 N.E.2d 525 (Mass. 2000).
Id. at 527.
Id.
Id. at 528.
Id.
Id. at 532.
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generalized claims by plaintiffs of injury such as loss of use and enjoyment of
property.”290 The court summarily rejected the plaintiffs’ standing arguments
predicated on their constitutional environmental right in Article XCVII in a
footnote.291
The final and most interesting case from Massachusetts attempted to use
the constitutional environmental right to improve substantive environmental
quality in the most direct manner of any of the environmental constitutionalism
cases in this Article. It is a federal district court case brought by a pro se plaintiff
on account of high levels of lead in the drinking water in the schools in the
Amherst-Pelham Regional School District.292 The pro se plaintiff had a grandson
who attended school in the district, and the plaintiff himself had visited his
grandson’s school.293 The plaintiff claimed that the lead levels in the school
drinking water violated his294 right “to clean water” under Article XCVII.295
Rather than seeking monetary damages, the plaintiff sought declaratory and
injunctive relief “requiring [the] Defendant [school district] to provide bottled
water to schools, install lead-free water supply lines in contaminated schools,
conduct periodic lead testing, and perform an independent assessment of the
extent of students’ and others’ lead exposure.”296
As to the plaintiff’s state constitutional environmental rights claim, the
district court had to decide whether the constitutional environmental right
provided a private right of action.297 After a thorough review of Massachusetts
precedent on Article XCVII, the district court concluded that there was no
indication from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that Article XCVII
provides a private right of action to enforce the substantive environmental rights
clause of Article XCVII.298 Because federal courts typically do not extend state
law beyond what is supported by existing authority, the district court concluded
that there was no private right of action for the pro se plaintiff to enforce his
right “to clean water” under Article XCVII.299 While the constitutional
environmental rights claim was decided on federalism principles, this is a crucial
example of how the substantive language of the environmental right may be

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 530.
Id. at 532 n.7.
Hootstein v. Amherst-Pelham Reg’l Sch. Comm., 361 F. Supp. 3d 94 (D. Mass. 2019).
Id. at 99–101.
Id. at 101–02. The court did not allow the pro se plaintiff to bring any claims on behalf of his grandson.

Id.
295. Id. at 101.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 113–14.
298. Id. at 114.
299. Id. at 114–15. While this seems like a loss, the pro se plaintiff also brought a Fourteenth Amendment
due process bodily integrity claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the court determined was “plausibly stated”
in the complaint. Id. at 112.
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invoked in the future, particularly in Pennsylvania and Montana, where their
constitutions contain substantive rights language akin to Massachusetts’.
The development of Massachusetts’ constitutional environmental right has
been along much narrower lines—think the two-thirds clause—than the
development of Pennsylvania, Montana, and Hawaii’s constitutional
environmental rights. The fifth and final constitutional environmental right in
Illinois has even less development, primarily because the Illinois Supreme Court
has found the right to be extremely limited.
E.

ILLINOIS
1.

The Constitutional Text

The Illinois constitutional environmental right is contained in Article XI,
Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution, which states: “Each person has the right to
a healthful environment. Each person may enforce this right against any party,
governmental or private, through appropriate legal proceedings subject to
reasonable limitation and regulation as the General Assembly may provide by
law.”300 The right is not listed among Illinois’ fundamental rights.301
2.

The Case Law

The first case to consider the Section 2 right was the 1978 case Landfill,
Inc. v. Pollution Control Board.302 There, the plaintiff challenged the Illinois
Pollution Control Board’s (“PCB”) adoption of a rule authorizing third parties
to initiate permit-revocation proceedings, because third parties had sought to
have the plaintiff’s landfill permit revoked.303 The PCB adopted this rule
pursuant to its statutory authority under the Illinois Environmental Protection
Act (“IEPA”), and claimed that because the issuance of permits can infringe on
third parties’ Section 2 environmental right, those third parties are “entitled by
due process to a hearing on the allowance of permits.”304 The Illinois Supreme
Court was not persuaded by the PCB’s due process argument, because the IEPA
authorized citizen suits against alleged violators of the IEPA.305 The court
determined that a citizen’s IEPA remedy was statutory and thus permitted filing
a new complaint against the polluter, not an action before the PCB challenging
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301.
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ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
See id. art. I.
387 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. 1978).
Id. at 259–60.
Id. at 265.
See id.

162

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:123

the agency’s performance of its statutory duties.306 The court’s reading of the
Section 2 right only became more restricted as the cases progressed.
Next, in 1984, the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly rejected the claim that
the constitutional environmental right is a fundamental right.307 In Illinois Pure
Water Committee, Inc. v. Director of Public Health, the plaintiffs challenged a
statute that required drinking water to be fluorinated.308 The plaintiffs claimed
that fluorinating drinking water violated their Section 2 environmental right to a
healthful environment, that the right was fundamental, and therefore the
fluorination statute should be subject to a higher level of scrutiny upon judicial
review.309 Noting that the plaintiffs provided no support for the contention that
the Section 2 right is a fundamental right, the court declined to subject the
fluorination statute to a higher level of scrutiny review.310
The next decision further limiting the Section 2 right came in 1995.311 In
City of Elgin v. County of Cook, several cities and villages sought to challenge a
“balefill permit” issued to and by the defendants that would approve the
construction of a new landfill to handle solid waste from approximately 950,000
Cook County residents.312 In the final legal issue addressed by the Illinois
Supreme Court, the citizens alleged that preliminary construction activities for
this landfill facility would constitute a violation of their Section 2 environmental
right.313 The court concluded that Section 2 did not create “any new cause of
action but, rather, d[id] away with the ‘special injury’ requirement typically
employed in environmental nuisance cases.”314 Hence, in Illinois, there must be
a cause of action prior to any invocation of the constitutional environmental
right.
This conclusion was applied by the First District Appellate Court two years
later in a case between private parties over the sale of land.315 In NBD Bank v.
Krueger Ringier, Inc., the plaintiffs sought to recover in tort the costs they
incurred investigating, cleaning, removing, and restoring petroleumcontaminated soil on a parcel of property they purchased from the defendants.316
306. Id. This case is structurally similar to the electricity cases in Hawaii, albeit with a different outcome.
See supra Part III.C.2. The PCB adopted a rule to allow citizens to intervene in PCB permitting procedures on
the grounds that citizens have a due process right to intervene based on the state constitutional environmental
right. Unlike the Hawaii Supreme Court, however, the Illinois Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that
PCB’s rule was not permissible.
307. See generally Ill. Pure Water Comm., Inc. v. Dir. of Pub. Health, 470 N.E.2d 988 (Ill. 1984).
308. Id. at 989.
309. Id. at 989–91.
310. Id. at 992.
311. See generally City of Elgin v. Cnty. of Cook, 660 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. 1995).
312. Id. at 878–80.
313. Id. at 890–91.
314. Id. at 891.
315. NBD Bank v. Krueger Ringier, Inc., 686 N.E.2d 704, 709 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
316. Id. at 706.

December 2022]

THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE

163

The plaintiff suffered economic loss in having to remediate the purchased
property, and one of the plaintiff’s theories of liability in tort was a claim for a
“constitutional tort” pursuant to Article XI, Section 2. Applying City of Elgin,
the First District concluded that the constitutional environmental right “does not
create any new causes of action, but merely eliminated the ‘special injury’
requirement typically mandated in environmental nuisance cases.”317 Because
the plaintiff had failed to advance a viable theory of action in tort, Section 2 did
not “create a mechanism by which plaintiffs c[ould] recover against [the]
defendant for the damages” sought in the complaint.318
The final nail in the coffin for the Illinois constitutional environmental right
was hammered down two years later, in 1999.319 In Glisson v. City of Marion,
the plaintiff filed suit against the City of Marion and its mayor to halt the
construction of a dam on Sugar Creek, claiming that the project threatened the
essential habitat for two species protected under the Illinois Endangered Species
Act (“IESA”), the brook lamprey and the Indiana crayfish.320 The plaintiff
further alleged he would “suffer ‘intense harm’ as a result of the dam and
reservoir project because he is a naturalist who enjoys and uses Sugar Creek for
‘food gathering, recreation, spiritual, and educational activities,’ and because his
lifestyle is ‘intertwined with and dependent on the natural world in general and
Sugar Creek.’”321 On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the singular issue
was whether the plaintiff had standing to maintain an action against the
defendants for an alleged violation of the IESA.322
As a general matter, standing in Illinois requires that the “claimed injury
. . . be actual or threatened.323 It must be (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly
traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented
or redressed by the grant of the requested relief.”324 Less technically, Illinois
standing requires that “the plaintiff be a member of the class designed to be
protected by the statute, or one for whose benefit the statute was enacted, and to
whom a duty of compliance is owed.”325 The plaintiff claimed that Article XI,
Section 2 granted him standing, because the two endangered species were
necessary to the maintenance of his “healthful environment,” and thus the
proposed dam would injure his legally cognizable interest in a “healthy
environment.”326
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 709.
Id. at 710.
See generally Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034 (Ill. 1999).
Id. at 1036.
Id. at 1038.
Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1040 (citing Greer v. Ill. Hous. Dev. Auth., 524 N.E.2d 561, 575 (Ill. 1988)).
Id.
Id. (citing Lynch v. Devine, 359 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)).
Id. at 1041.
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The Illinois Supreme Court, in its first investigation into the constitutional
history of the Section 2 right, was faced with a tension between the plain
language of the right and the intent of the framers. As the court details in Glisson,
the General Government Committee, which proposed the environmental right at
the 1970 constitutional convention, was clearly focused on the issue of
environmental pollution and its direct effects on human life.327 The court
acknowledged that the Committee intended the environmental right to be a
fundamental right, contrary to the court’s finding in Illinois Pure Water
Committee, Inc. in 1984.328 The Committee had also emphasized that the Section
2 right was not intended to create any new remedies, but to remove the “special
injury” requirement for standing in order to allow individual opportunity to
prove a violation of the right, even though the violation may have been a public
wrong.329 The Committee’s understanding was confirmed during its discussion
of Section 2 at the constitutional convention.330 On this basis, the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that the constitutional environmental right was a
response to the problem of environmental pollution and its effect on human
health.331 Therefore, “[t]he protection of endangered and threatened species does
not fall within the intended scope of a person’s right to a ‘healthful
environment.’”332 Even faced with the argument from amici curiae that
protection of endangered species is necessary for a “healthful environment,” the
court was not persuaded and ultimately concluded that the plaintiff did not have
standing to bring an IESA action under Article XI, Section 2.333
The Glisson dissent made a very simple, but powerful point: nothing in the
plain language of the constitutional text, which ought to control over convention
or committee history, limits the Section 2 right to pollution cases.334 Under the
plain meaning of the constitutional language, the dissent would have held that
Section 2 authorizes private actions to enforce the IESA.335 Unfortunately,
Illinois’ constitutional environmental right has not been reevaluated since the
Glisson decision in 1999 and is therefore only applicable in the narrow context
of public pollution cases. The Glisson case makes the Illinois constitutional
environmental right by far the least effective in making environmental gains of
the five rights discussed in this Article.
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At this stage, it is important to recognize just how diverse the five
constitutional environmental rights really are. The nomenclature of
“environmental constitutionalism” is therefore a bit misleading, as there is no
obvious one thing that a constitutional environmental right aims for or achieves.
Notably, however, and as I will discuss in Parts III and IV, all of the state
constitutional environmental rights contain substantive environmental rights
language.
III. LESSONS FROM THE STATES
While the five original states have five very different constitutional
environmental rights, this Part proposes two lessons to take away from their
constitutional environmental rights jurisprudence. Those lessons are: (1) that
constitutional environmental rights have been interpreted primarily as
procedural, not substantive, rights, and (2) that courts ignore the substantive
rights language in the constitutional text in favor of other language, which is
then given its content through other legal doctrines. These lessons are best
understood as descriptive claims regarding how courts interpret constitutional
environmental rights provisions. I discuss the normative importance of these
lessons in Part IV.
A. PROCEDURAL, NOT SUBSTANTIVE, RIGHTS
The first lesson from the states is that courts interpret their constitutional
environmental rights as essentially procedural, not substantive, rights. In the
context of environmental constitutionalism, substantive environmental rights
can be thought to entitle a claim holder to “a certain level of environmental
quality.”336 They are usually written as something like the right to an
“‘adequate,’ ‘clean,’ ‘healthy,’ ‘productive,’ ‘harmonious,’ ‘sustainable,’
environment.”337 However, it is not quite right to think of substantive
environmental rights as claims to a tangible thing that is an adequate, healthy,
clean, productive, harmonious, or sustainable environment. Substantive
environmental rights are really claims against others to act—or refrain from
acting—in certain ways that have the effect of producing a certain level of
environmental quality.338 In the case of constitutional substantive environmental
rights, they should be claims against the government339—although Montana
(MEIC and Cape-France), Hawaii (Ala Loop), and Illinois (its constitutional
language) clearly indicate that they can also be claims against private parties.
336. BOYD, supra note 6, at 25.
337. See MAY & DALY, supra note 6, at 64.
338. See id. at 95 (viewing rights as “ways to structure relationships”); see also Hohfeld, supra note 17, at
26 (analyzing legal rights into four fundamental relations).
339. See BOYD, supra note 6, at 25.
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The government may be obligated to “both refrain from taking or authorizing
actions that impair citizens’ right to a healthy environment and, where necessary,
to take positive actions to ensure or safeguard citizens’ right to environmental
quality.”340 In the context of concrete environmental disputes, it is helpful to
think of substantive environmental rights as claims that would entitle the right
holder to some substantive environmental action or inaction, such as preventing
the commencement of a proposed mining operation or requiring restoration of
degraded public land.
Procedural environmental rights focus not on substantive environmental
outcomes but on citizens’ access to information, participation in decisionmaking, access to justice, and remedies for environmental harms.341 An
environmental procedural right is not an entitlement to actions that produce a
particular environmental outcome. It is only a claim to a certain kind of
participation in the process that will have or has had environmental effects.
Procedural environmental rights are considered complementary to substantive
environmental rights, since access to information, participation in decisionmaking, and access to the courts to demand a remedy are all crucial components
of enforcing substantive environmental rights.342 Erin Daly and James May go
so far as to claim that procedural environmental rights may be “even more useful
than substantive environmental rights because courts might be more inclined to
use them to vindicate environmental interests while pushing the actual decision
making to the political sphere.”343
In applying this procedural-substantive distinction to the five original
states, we see that all five constitutional environmental rights contain substantive
environmental rights language in the constitutional text itself. In Pennsylvania,
the language is “a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the environment.”344 In Montana,
it is a “right to a clean and healthful environment”;345 in Hawaii, “the right to a
clean and healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental
quality”;346 in Massachusetts, “the right to clean air and water, freedom from
excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and aesthetic
340. Id.
341. Id. at 26; HAYWARD, supra note 6, at 87. The procedural-substantive rights distinction in environmental
constitutionalism has not been as robustly defended or criticized as it has been in legal theory more generally.
See generally, e.g., Larry Alexander, Are Procedural Rights Derivative of Substantive Rights?, 17 L. & PHIL. 19
(1998) (arguing that procedural rights are derivative of substantive rights). I adopt the distinction as posited by
the environmental constitutionalism movement at this time without further theorizing on the validity of the
distinction.
342. See MAY & DALY, supra note 6, at 236; BOYD, supra note 6, at 26.
343. MAY & DALY, supra note 6, at 238.
344. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
345. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
346. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
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qualities of their environment”;347 and in Illinois, “the right to a healthful
environment.”348 Yet the development of these rights in the case law has been
along the lines of procedural rather than substantive rights.
Consider Pennsylvania. The first constitutional environmental rights case
in Pennsylvania, Payne, addressed a quintessential substantive environmental
rights claim.349 The plaintiffs claimed that the government was not permitted to
widen a particular road onto a particular historically and aesthetically valuable
piece of public land, and resolution in favor of the Payne plaintiffs would have
compelled the government to act in such a way as to produce a particular quality
of environment: namely, not degrading the public land to construct a public road.
However, the court refused to recognize such a substantive right.350
The environmental victories based on the Pennsylvania constitutional
environmental right have come in the form of participation in self-governance
by challenging state legislation. Robinson Township struck down portions of Act
13 that preempted local governments from regulating the location of fracking
wells and that entitled the oil and gas industry to automatic waivers of setbacks
for well locations near certain bodies of water.351 This did not entitle the
Robinson Township plaintiffs to the outright banning of fracking wells. Fracking
wells may still be approved in residential neighborhoods,352 and waivers of
setbacks may still be granted to the oil and gas industry.353 Similarly, in PEDF
II, the court struck down legislative acts that allocated revenue derived from the
public trust to non-trust purposes.354 But such action does not produce any
particular environmental outcome. The funds are required for “conservation”
purposes, but there is no particular conservation that must occur and no timeline
within which it must occur.
Montana’s constitutional environmental rights jurisprudence is similar to
Pennsylvania’s in this regard. MEIC struck down a state statute allowing an
exploration mining license to be automatically exempt from non-degradation
review.355 This did not mean that the proposed mining project would not satisfy
non-degradation review, in which case the mining would commence. The
plaintiffs’ constitutional environmental right did not entitle them to a prohibition
347. MASS. CONST. art. XCVII.
348. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
349. See supra Part II.A.2.
350. See supra Part II.A.2.
351. See supra Part II.A.2.
352. See Frederick v. Allegheny Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 196 A.3d 677, 701 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018).
353. The court’s reasoning certainly seems to allow for the possibility of waivers of setbacks in the event
the legislature articulates “identifiable and readily-enforceable environmental standards for granting well
permits or setback waivers,” which “conserve and maintain” the waters of the commonwealth. Robinson Twp.
v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 983 (Pa. 2013).
354. See supra Part II.A.2.
355. See supra Part II.B.2.
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on the exploration mining activities. In Park County, we see the same theme.
The 2011 MEPA amendments, which prohibited courts from enjoining a MEPAdeficient permit while the permit went through the proper MEPA review, were
declared unconstitutional.356 The plaintiffs were entitled to have the MEPAdeficient permit enjoined while the permit went through proper MEPA review.
That is not the same as enjoining the proposed project, tout court. All that means
is that the proper procedures for issuing the permit were not followed. The
permit may still issue once all the proper procedures are followed. The plaintiffs
are not entitled to a specific environmental outcome with respect to the proposed
mining project on the basis of their constitutional environmental right. Clark
Fork even went so far as to say that the procedural constitutional environmental
right does not even guarantee plaintiffs’ access to a particular means to be heard,
just access to some means to be heard.357
The closest Montana came to recognizing a substantive environmental
right would have been in the Cape-France case, where the court determined that
the seller of land would violate the public’s environmental right by drilling a
water test well near a known pollution plume.358 That result meant that the seller
was obligated not to drill a test well and thereby not risk a serious negative
environmental outcome. However, the court’s reluctance to recognize the
Montana constitutional environmental right as establishing a constitutional tort
in Sunburst359 and Shammel360 puts doubt on how favorably the court would
consider a substantive environmental rights claim like the one in Payne.
Hawaii is a little bit different than Pennsylvania or Montana, because
Hawaii’s constitutional environmental right has not been invoked to strike down
state statutes. While the right has been claimed in two different ways, it is
reasonable to consider both as procedural rather than substantive claims. The
first way that the right has been claimed is exemplified by the Ala Loop decision:
as an entitlement to enforce state environmental statutes. Notably, the Ala Loop
plaintiffs only possessed an entitlement to require the charter school to go
through the Chapter 205 permit process with the proper government body.361 It
was not an entitlement to stop building the school. More generally, this is a right
that allows citizens to enforce state environmental laws, yet another kind of
procedural right. The substantive outcome is determined by the content of the
state law, not by the content of the environmental right.
The second way that the Hawaii constitutional environmental right has
been claimed is exemplified by the electricity cases: as an entitlement to due
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.C.2.
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process considerations. In those cases, the Hawaii Supreme Court determined
that the plaintiffs had a due process right based on their constitutional
environmental right to be full participants in the PUC’s PPA review and
approval process.362 By thus participating, the plaintiffs were able to hold the
PUC to its statutory duties. Notably, however, the PUC’s statutory duties do not
instruct the PUC to reject any of the disputed PPAs outright. The failure of the
PUC was that it did not consider the reduction of fossil fuels pursuant to its
statutory duties. In other words, the PUC may consider everything it is statutorily
required to consider, yet still approve the PPAs. The Hawaii constitutional
environmental right does not entitle the plaintiffs to the termination of the
disputed PPAs, which would constitute an entitlement to a particular
environmental outcome.
While the Hawaii constitutional environmental right is therefore essentially
procedural, it could have great value by giving citizens the power to enforce
legislation aimed at producing particular environmental outcomes, especially if
the government agencies tasked with enforcing environmental laws fail to do so.
However, it is still the legislature and agencies that define the parameters of
environmental regulation and how much degradation and pollution are
acceptable under Hawaii law, not the environmental right as interpreted by the
courts.
In Massachusetts, the procedural facet of the constitutional environmental
right comes into focus because of the two-thirds clause. The language of the
two-thirds clause is itself procedural. Only if the government wishes to dispose
of such lands or easements is the approval of two-thirds of the legislature
required. This amounts to a procedural safeguard on the government’s
management of conserved lands. The people, through their elected
representatives, must approve any such dispositions by a margin of two to one.
However, there is nothing that prohibits the government from disposing of lands
or easements taken for conservation purposes.
Interestingly, Massachusetts offers the most substantive environmental
rights claim in its constitutional environmental right jurisprudence as illustrated
by the federal district court case in Hootsein,363 where the pro se plaintiff
claimed that his right to clean water had been violated by elevated lead levels in
the drinking water of the Amherst-Pelham schools.364 There, the plaintiff
claimed an entitlement to a particular level of environmental quality in addition
to demanding that the school district be required to provide it.365 Unfortunately,

362.
363.
364.
365.

See supra Part II.C.2.
See supra Part II.D.2.
See supra Part II.D.2.
See supra Part II.D.2.
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the district court did not find any support in Massachusetts state law supporting
the plaintiff’s claim to a substantive environmental right.366
Finally, Illinois’ constitutional environmental right is so narrow that it is of
limited value, and what value it has is by virtue of being a procedural, not
substantive, right. All that the Illinois constitutional environmental right does is
expand the doctrine of standing in environmental pollution cases by eliminating
the special injury requirement for bringing a public pollution claim against a
polluter. This expands access to the courts for seeking legal redress for
environmental harms, but it in no way entitles a claimant to new or additional
substantive environmental outcomes that do not already exist at law. The only
effort to vindicate the Illinois constitutional environmental right as a substantive
right came in Illinois Pure Water Committee, Inc. in 1984, where the plaintiffs
sought to strike down a state statute requiring fluorination in drinking water.367
Even if the plaintiffs had been victorious, however, striking down such a statute
would not have prohibited fluorinating drinking water. It would have still
permitted water districts to choose whether to fluorinate their drinking water,
making it structurally similar to Robinson Township striking down Act 13.
B. BORROWING FROM OTHER LEGAL DOCTRINE
The courts tasked with interpreting these constitutional environmental
rights have by and large focused on the constitutional language, which readily
maps onto already established legal doctrines. And where such language is
lacking, courts have looked to other established doctrines for interpreting the
right. This means that courts have not articulated the boundaries of the
substantive rights language contained within their respective constitutions. I do
not go so far as to claim this is intentional avoidance, as I think the nature of the
cases brought before the courts plays a role in what part of the constitutional text
is most relevant. However, it is striking that for all the cases decided on the basis
of these constitutional environmental rights, we have little idea of what the “right
to clean water and air” or the “right to a healthy environment” really looks like
in the eyes of the judiciary.
Despite this pattern of avoidance, Pennsylvania provides the most
information regarding its substantive rights language. The Robinson Township
plurality tells us that the state cannot unreasonably impair the substantive right,
and that the substantive right is a bulwark against actual or likely degradation of
air and water quality.368 However, the court never returns to the substantive right
to tell us what air and water quality the right entitles Pennsylvanians to. Instead,
the majority of Pennsylvania environmental rights case law focuses on the public
366. See supra Part II.D.2.
367. See supra Part II.E.2.
368. See supra Part II.A.2.
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trust language in the constitutional environmental right provision. Relying on
that language allows the court to import duties well grounded in Pennsylvania
private trust law into the contours of its environmental rights jurisprudence. The
court is not tasked with declaring what would amount to entirely new duties for
the government. Instead, once the government is recognized as a trustee by the
plain language of the constitutional provision, the duties follow under
established legal doctrine. Those duties have been invoked to evaluate the
constitutionality of the exercise of government powers, such as passing
legislation and amending zoning ordinances. It is possible such duties will be
invoked more substantively in the future,369 but it has not happened yet.
Montana is the lone state that does not have other constitutional language
to rely on, and therefore must focus on the substantive environmental rights text
in its constitutional provisions. Montana, however, still relies on another
developed area of legal doctrine in interpreting its constitutional environmental
right: the tiered scrutiny analysis that has been developed in federal
constitutional law to evaluate federal laws that burden fundamental rights.370
Because the Montana constitutional environmental right has been recognized as
a fundamental right, turning to scrutiny analysis is a reasonable doctrinal choice
for the court. It provides a well-accepted framework for evaluating exercises of
governmental power that burden fundamental rights. However, it is important to
recognize that federal scrutiny analysis typically occurs when a federal law is
claimed to burden a fundamental privilege,371 such as the privilege to travel
interstate or the privilege to marry a person of the same or opposite sex. Montana
is applying scrutiny analysis to what would appear to be a claim right, not a
privilege right, based on its substantive constitutional environmental rights
language.
I would posit that this is why Montana’s implication analysis, within its
scrutiny analysis, is so ungeneralizable. When a court is tasked with determining
whether a privilege right is implicated by a law, the question is the sphere of
action within which individuals are entitled to autonomy and whether the law
affects that sphere of autonomy. When a court is tasked with determining
whether a claim right is implicated by a law, we need to know the contours of
the duty correlative to the claim right to evaluate whether the law permits actions
inconsistent with that duty. In the case of Montana’s constitutional
environmental right, the Montana Supreme Court has not explicitly stated any
369. See Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Pa. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., No. 525 M.D. 2017, 2018 WL 3554639, at
*9–10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 4, 2018) (refusing to hold that citizens categorically could not compel DEQ to
undertake toxic waste remediation under Section 27). This case is still being litigated, but the trustee’s duties
may be interpreted substantively to require affirmative remediation of environmental degradation by the state.
370. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 858–59 (Erin
Chemerinsky et al. eds., 6th ed. 2019).
371. See Hohfeld, supra note 17, at 32–33.
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general principle that captures the government’s substantive environmental duty
under the constitutional text. If we were to try to distill such a general principle
from the case law, it might be something like the following: where the
government exercise of power permits actions that may cause environmental
degradation, the right is implicated (MEIC and Park County), but where the
government exercise of power only permits actions that are themselves
permissions to seek further approval to commence an activity that may cause
environmental degradation, the right is not implicated (Northern Plains and
Clark Fork).
Even with such an attempted formulation, we still do not have a great grasp
of the content of the government’s substantive environmental duty, and as I
discussed in Part II.A, the Montana Supreme Court has not interpreted
Montana’s environmental right as a substantive right, anyway. I believe this is
why Montana’s jurisprudence is the least cohesive of the five states. The
language of the right is clearly substantive, and the court appeals to legal
doctrine (i.e., scrutiny analysis) that works best when determining the
substantive parameters of duties (or no-duties, in the case of privileges). The
Montana cases reveal, however, what is essentially a procedural environmental
right by striking down laws that only ensure proper procedures are followed but
guarantee no substantive environmental outcomes.
I do think it is possible for Montana’s constitutional environmental right to
be invoked in a substantive context and evaluated under scrutiny analysis. The
challenge would have to be something like a challenge to a mining permit issued
by DEQ on substantive grounds, not on procedural grounds. The claim would
have to be that such a permit is impermissible as a substantive matter, not due to
procedural infirmity. Such a claim would force the Montana Supreme Court to
expand the boundaries of impermissibility in mining, even though the state has
statutory law governing those boundaries (the MMRA). It is hard to believe that
a court would take on that task for a variety of reasons, such as separation of
powers and scientific expertise concerns.
Hawaii is unique in relying on other legal doctrine to fill in the contours of
its constitutional environmental right, because Hawaii’s constitutional text
explicitly defines the constitutional right in terms of its statutory law. By
defining the right referentially, the content of the right is indirectly set by the
Hawaii legislature. The court is only tasked with developing an analysis for
determining which Hawaii statutes fall within the scope of the constitutional
right—which is likely much more appealing to a court than what Montana’s
courts could be called to do. This is the analysis that we see in Ala Loop
(determining that Chapter 205 falls within the scope of the constitutional
environmental right) and in the electricity cases (determining that Chapter 269
falls within the scope of the constitutional environmental right).
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Hawaii also uses its constitutional environmental right to expand its due
process doctrine. The constitutional environmental right, as defined by statutory
law, can establish the property interest protected by due process, as seen in the
three electricity cases. Hawaii citizens are legally entitled to their government
adhering to its statutory environmental duties, which may permit participation
and an opportunity to be heard in certain government procedures (i.e., a
procedural right). Here, the constitutional environmental right is not looking to
other doctrine for its content, but rather expanding the content of another right,
namely the Hawaii due process right. Thus, Hawaii’s constitutional
environmental right is hardly a right on its own. Rather, it sits embedded in other
legal doctrines that are the primary source of the meaning of the right.
Massachusetts’ jurisprudence is similar to Pennsylvania’s, focusing on one
part of the constitutional text over other parts. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has not interpreted the substantive environmental rights language
contained in its constitutional text. Instead, the focus has been on the two-thirds
clause and whether the government is attempting to dispose of lands or
easements taken for constitutional conservation purposes. The Opinion of the
Justices to the Senate makes clear that “lands” or “easements” are defined in
traditional property law terms.372 The remaining case law clarifies what it means
for lands or easements to be “taken for” constitutional conservation purposes.
This started mostly on an ad hoc basis in Miller, Simms, and Selectmen of
Hanson.373 By Mahajan, however, the court made clear that “take for” is to be
interpreted through the “prior public use” common-law doctrine, because that is
the background against which the constitutional amendment was approved.374
City of Westfield reaffirms this understanding.375 Rather than having to come up
with doctrine from scratch, the court can rely on long-established preexisting
legal principles.
Illinois’ constitutional environmental right is so limited that it does not
even exist independently of some other legally recognized cause of action, as we
learn in City of Elgin.376 There is no recognition of any new duties tout court
pursuant to the Illinois constitutional environmental right. By altering the
standing test in limited circumstances, there is only the minor expansion of the
class of individuals who may enforce duties regarding pollution.

372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

See supra Part II.D.2.
See supra Part II.D.2.
See supra Part II.D.2.
See supra Part II.D.2.
See supra Part II.E.2.
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IV. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
This Article has provided a comprehensive overview of the state of
environmental constitutional rights jurisprudence in the United States by
focusing on how state supreme courts have defined the scopes of their respective
constitutional environmental rights through the cases that have invoked those
rights. I contend that although constitutional environmental rights have had their
successes—and for that reason have environmental value—they ultimately fail
to achieve the principled environmental goals that an environmental right should
secure. In failing to execute a rights paradigm shift, the promise of
environmental constitutionalism remains unfulfilled.
As an initial matter, it must be emphasized that the contemporary
environmental constitutionalism movement is not particularly clear in what it
thinks an environmental right should accomplish for the people.377 What
motivated the ratification of these five constitutional environmental rights was
pollution and harm to human health caused by the massive dissemination of
industrial chemicals into the environment.378 But we continue to face serious
matters of industrial pollution today. It is just that the pollution is hidden from
the naked eye in the form of things like PFAS,379 microplastics,380 flame
retardant chemicals,381 and lead,382 to name a few. For all the attention and
“success” these constitutional environmental rights have claimed, they have not
been invoked in the context of their original purpose and motivation.383
If contemporary environmental constitutionalism is simply about
establishing participation in self-governance (Pennsylvania and Montana) and
holding the state to its otherwise articulated legal obligations (Hawaii), then the
377. The movement has empiricists that are working on showing correlations between constitutional
environmental provisions and better environmental outcomes. See, e.g., Chris Jeffords & Joshua C. Gellers,
Implementing Substantive Constitutional Environmental Rights: A Quantitative Assessment of Current Practices
Using Benchmark Rankings, in IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: CURRENT GLOBAL
CHALLENGES 34, 38 (Daly & May eds., 2018). But that does not solve the problem that there is no concept of a
goal for the constitutionalization of environmental rights.
378. See supra Part I.
379. See, e.g., Sharon Lerner, Bad Chemistry, THE INTERCEPT, https://theintercept.com/collections/badchemistry/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
380. See generally, e.g., Amit Hasan Anik, Shabiha Hossain, Mahbub Alam, Maisha Binte Sultan, Tanvir
Hasnine & Mostafizur Rahman, Microplastics Pollution: A Comprehensive Review on the Sources, Fates,
Effects, and Potential Remediation, ENV’T NANOTECH., MONITORING & MGMT., Dec. 2021.
381. See, e.g., Rosemary Castorina, Asa Bradman, Heather M. Stapleton, Craig Butt, Dylan Avery, Kim G.
Harley, Robert B. Gunier, Nina Holland & Brenda Eskenazi, Current-Use Flame Retardants: Maternal
Exposure and Neurodevelopment in Children of the CHAMACOS Cohort, 189 CHEMOSPHERE 574, 574–75
(2017).
382. See, e.g., Ryan Felton, Lisa Gill & Lewis Kendall, We Sampled Tap Water Across the US—and Found
Arsenic, Lead and Toxic Chemicals, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2021, 6:00 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com
/us-news/2021/mar/31/americas-tap-water-samples-forever-chemicals.
383. This is with the exception of the Hootstein case in Massachusetts, which was dismissed on federalism
principles. 361 F. Supp. 3d 94 (D. Mass. 2019); see also supra Part III.D.2.
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constitutional environmental rights we have seen in the United States can do a
lot of good and provide avenues to that goal. They establish a new entitlement
to citizen participation in environmental governance. Additionally, procedural
infirmities can still result in substantive environmental outcomes, especially
when such infirmities impose additional costs on the environmentally harmful
project, making such projects less profitable.384
However, procedural environmental rights are still fundamentally limited.
Procedural environmental rights are capable of working well on their own only
if there is a government in place that is responsive to its people. There has to be
a body of politicians and government agents that listens to the concerns of the
people and effectively translates those concerns into substantive environmental
outcomes. For example, in the Hawaii electricity cases, the PUC failed to
consider fossil fuel reduction in approving the challenged PPAs. There is
nothing that indicates that those PPAs were impermissible or would be struck
down by a court under Hawaii’s constitutional environmental right if the PUC
simply noted that it considered the need to reduce fossil fuel generation in
approving the agreements. Thus illustrated, a procedural environmental right can
still result in pollution and degradation being deemed permissible, because there
is no substantive entitlement against pollution and degradation. There is no
entitlement to stop a project that will—take your pick—increase carbon
emissions and climate change impacts, irreparably damage a beautiful
landscape, eliminate an important habitat for a locally endangered species, or
put high levels of cancer-causing pollutants into a groundwater aquifer. Being
heard does not mean that the listener will agree and do what is asked.
Because of this lack of entitlement to substantive outcomes, constitutional
environmental rights have failed to effectuate the paradigm shift that rightsbased language is supposed to convey in the environmental context. Often,
though not invariably, the purpose of rights language is simply to limit the
applicability of tradeoff reasoning. Rights communicate the elevation of certain
interests to a categorical position where those interests are not traded to
maximize social welfare, especially where those interests are protected from
demands that they be sacrificed.385 These constitutional environmental rights
were ratified to elevate the interests of the citizens of each state in the

384. For example, while the Glisson court determined that the Illinois plaintiff did not possess any
constitutional environmental right to halt the construction of the Sugar Creek dam, the dam was in fact never
built due to environmentalists’ continued efforts opposing the project. 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Ill. 1999); See
Field Notes Entry: Permit Denied for Lake on Sugar Creek in Southern Illinois, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.
(June 27, 2007), https://www.fws.gov/FieldNotes/regmap.cfm?arskey=21944&callingKey=region&calling
Value=3.
385. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191–92 (1977). For a more recent discussion of
the role of rights as “trumps” over utilitarian reasoning, see generally Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court 2017
Term: Forward: Rights as Trumps, 132 HAR. L. REV. 28 (2018).
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environment itself above traditional tradeoff reasoning that is made on the basis
of economic efficiency and the maximization of social welfare (which does not
take into account distribution of such welfare). Yet, the rights have never been
successfully invoked as an entitlement against (or requiring) certain actions that
would respect this interest of the people in their natural world. To put it more
bluntly, these rights do not shut down corporate exploitation of the environment.
They only punt the question of “how much exploitation?” or “which
exploitation?” to some other decisionmaker, whom we can reasonably anticipate
will view the exploitation as socially desirable in many regards. If the
environmental right does not have the force of a right per se in such a case, it
fails to effectuate the paradigm shift a rights-based environmentalism aims for.
The weakness of the contemporary environmental movement is this
unwillingness to contemplate the possibility that it should make categorical
demands against certain environmentally harmful activities, regardless of their
other social benefit. It buys into the illusion that somehow we can have our cake
and eat it too. We can frack anywhere, if we just do enough to make it
environmentally friendly. We can mine remote areas, if we just do enough to
restore them when we are done. The point of a constitutional environmental right
ought to be that some environmental harms are categorically prohibited,
regardless of precautions, remediation efforts, and social benefit. We should not
frack, nor should we wild areas for mining operations, regardless of precautions,
remediations efforts, and social benefits. Whatever loss to social welfare
prohibition requires is of no consequence to the determination of whether or not
the activity is permissible. Until such a paradigm shift is achieved, the promise
of environmental constitutionalism will remain largely unfulfilled, and it will
never have the character of a true rights-based movement.
V. LESSONS FOR THE STATES
When I began work on this Article in late 2020, I did not anticipate that the
moves in New York and New Jersey to constitutionalize an environmental right
would spread like wildfire in 2021. Because it has, it is worth briefly touching
on the new wave of constitutional environmental rights and providing some
pragmatic advice for those proposing these state-level green amendments.
First, all of the constitutional environmental rights explored in this
Article—including those pending or recently ratified in New York, New Jersey,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and West
Virginia—contain substantive environmental rights language. While the
substantive environmental rights language seems necessary to include in the
constitutional text, I have argued in this Article that courts actually shy away
from providing content to substantive constitutional environmental rights
claims, so such language ends up being the least useful in constitutional text.
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This means that the excitement over New York voters ratifying the green
amendment386 is overblown. Equally overblown are the negative reactions to
New York’s green amendment.387 New York’s constitutional environmental
right is most similar to what we see in Montana. Given that jurisprudence, New
York courts will likely also struggle to interpret the right in a principled way and
will almost certainly not create any new substantive environmental entitlements
held by the people. Without such entitlements, it is hard to see how the right will
“devastate the state’s economy”388 or produce significantly positive
environmental outcomes. Nonetheless, such language reflects the amendment’s
strong substantive rights language. Without such language, no substantive
environmental rights claims can even be made. For that reason, it should still be
included in all green amendments.
Second, advocates of environmental rights amendments must decide
whether they will pursue the creation of a public trust in the constitutional text.
Choosing to create the public trust allows courts to import private trust doctrine
into their constitutional environmental rights jurisprudence, as we see in
Pennsylvania; provides authority to judicial decisions; and allows judges to
avoid the hard substantive rights questions (e.g., what level of lead in drinking
water counts as “clean water”?). States can look to Pennsylvania’s jurisprudence
for guidance in the future if their rights amendment contains similar trust
language. Furthermore, while I have argued that we have not seen much by way
of substantive environmental outcomes on the basis of the substantive
environmental rights language, the trustee’s duties to not degrade the corpus of
the public trust and to treat beneficiaries impartially may have potential to
develop into substantive environmental claims. Whether they do depends on the
claims brought in court and whether judges feel comfortable drawing
substantive environmental lines that go against environmental agency decisions
or corporate interests on the basis of private trust law.
New Jersey, Iowa, Kentucky, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, and
West Virginia have elected to incorporate public trust language into their
proposed amendments. In a unique move, Maine has elected to remove the
public trust language from its proposed amendment. Vermont’s text mimics
Pennsylvania’s very closely, but lacks reference to the state as trustee. For clarity
and to avoid avenues for challenge by would-be polluters (thereby delaying
decisions on substantive grounds), Vermont’s bill sponsors should make the
creation of the trust clear, if that is their intent.
386. “Each person shall have a right to clean air and water, and a healthful environment.” N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 19.
387. See, e.g., James B. Miggs, Why NY’s Proposed ‘Green Amendment’ Could Devastate the State’s
Economy, N.Y. POST (Oct. 20, 2021), https://nypost.com/2021/10/20/why-nys-proposed-green-amendmentcould-devastate-states-economy/.
388. Id.
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Notably, no state has followed the example set by Hawaii: to define the
content of the constitutional environmental right by reference to the state’s
environmental statutes.389 This is likely because the political attention has been
focused on Pennsylvania. Hopefully this Article gives lawmakers another
avenue to consider, one which I would contend may be quite powerful. Allowing
citizens to become enforcers of state environmental laws, both against private
parties and the government itself, is a very powerful tool that should not be
strongly disfavored over the creation of a public trust.
Third, there is the question of whether the constitutional environmental
right ought to be constitutionalized as a fundamental right—in other words, as a
natural, inalienable, inherent, indefeasible right. As a reminder, Pennsylvania
and Montana’s constitutional environmental rights are fundamental rights,
whereas Hawaii’s is not. The status of the right as fundamental has not played
an important, let alone determinative, role at this point. The value of recognizing
the constitutional environmental right as a fundamental right, however, comes
from the fact that it will be challenged against other legitimate government,
private property, and liberty interests. We saw the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
temper the environmental right by legitimate development in Robinson
Township,390 and we saw the Montana Supreme Court sidestep the clash between
its environmental right and private property rights in Park County.391 It is
inevitable that a court will have to decide between these constitutional
environmental rights, on the one hand, and development and private property,
on the other hand, in the future. Recognizing the constitutional environmental
right as a fundamental right can only help in those situations.
Fourth and finally, states should consider addressing several procedural
issues in the constitutional text. This includes explicitly indicating who can
enforce the constitutional environmental right and against whom the right may
be claimed (i.e., the government, private parties, or both). It also includes
explicitly stating that the right is self-executing and is meant to add to any other
statutory or common-law right. These kinds of matters typically take several
rounds of litigation for courts to resolve, so explicitly declaring them in the
constitutional text can reduce delay in achieving whatever efficacy the right may
be able to provide.

389. If it was not clear above, no state should follow Montana and New York and pass a green amendment
with essentially bare substantive environmental rights language. Courts have limited tools for developing the
contours of such a right into meaningful boundaries on environmentally harmful action. Pennsylvania’s trust
language and Hawaii’s referential language at least give the courts law to rely on in crafting their rights doctrines.
390. See 83 A.3d 901, 959 (Pa. 2013).
391. See 477 P.3d 288, 307–08 (Mont. 2020).
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CONCLUSION
The severity of our environmental crises should shock the conscience of
any reasonable person. The fact that we have gotten to such a state, even though
fifty years ago the people demanded we address our environmentally infirm
ways, should make any reasonable person deeply angry. It is not surprising that
the environmental movement would look to new strategies to address our current
environmental crises, including environmental constitutionalism, given that the
labyrinth of environmental statutory law has not stopped the reckless descent
into environmental catastrophe.
However, the political movement needs to take a long, hard look at what is
actually being achieved in court through constitutional environmental rights
claims. This Article has argued that there has not been the expected rights-based
paradigm shift catalyzed by environmental constitutionalism. This is because
constitutional environmental rights are not being interpreted as entitlements to
substantive environmental outcomes. Until they are, the promise of
environmental constitutionalism will remain unfulfilled.
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